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Introduction
As the French attempted to disengage in Indochina, they became bogged down in an intense
war. The United States came to their aid, but simultaneously looked ahead to an Indochina free of
French rule. As the U.S. strengthened France with aid, they aided Vietnam as well. By the time of
the French surrender in 1954, the U.S. was sure that South Vietnam would be able to join the bloc
of nations allied with the West in democracy. To help the Vietnamese get to this point,
development was to play a key role.
The only thing that stood in the way of developing the countryside, however, was the
security situation. Insurgency would need to be halted in order for development to take place. The
Kennedy administration pursued this security to no avail, and as the countryside became more and
more chaotic, development in South Vietnam became less and less likely. When Johnson became
president, he brought a new approach to development. Would this be enough to revive it? Could
the North Vietnamese and the Soviet Union be made into allies in the spirit of building damns,
bridges, and highways?
Development was roped into the struggle for the “hearts and minds” of traditional, nonindustrialized societies in the late 1950’s and 1960’s. Development and modernization theory were
championed as the way to prevent insurgency, and sell nations on a Non-Communist Manifesto.
But even these champions of development were prone to force when the going got tough. A twopronged policy of force and development only begot more force. Development would not occur
under these pretenses; its potential savior would abandon it. “Hearts and minds,” never won in the
first place, would be completely lost.
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Chapter 1: A Two-Pronged Policy
In 1951, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny thought he knew exactly what the Americans
in Vietnam were up to. Though commander of the French forces in the Indochina War for a
relatively short period (1951-1952), de Lattre quickly took issue with U.S. policy. While
Washington supported the French military substantially, it simultaneously prepared for a future
Indochinese peninsula devoid of French influence. Aid and projects undertaken by the Economic
Cooperation Association (ECA) and Special Technical and Economic Missions (STEMs) were in
de Lattre’s eyes “American machinations … transpiring behind our backs.” Amidst a war aimed
at retaining and strengthening the French Union, the French commander believed ECA and STEM
operations treated Vietnam essentially as an independent nation.1
De Lattre once called Robert Blum, director of the ECA and STEMs from 1950-1952, “the
most dangerous man in Indochina.” Blum’s later writings would confirm de Lattre’s suspicions:
he believed STEM operations would prove pivotal in building anti-Communist sentiment among
the Vietnamese people, and anticipated an impending French withdrawal from Indochina
approaching. During his two years of work in Vietnam he assured that American presence in the
region would increase in the vacuum left by the French.2
A short-lived predecessor of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the
ECA from 1948-1951 carried out Marshall Plan policy. The ECA's investments reflected the fiscal
conservatism of its members. Above all else, the administration encouraged investment returns
with its client countries. American aid dollars from the ECA often arrived in accordance with
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proposals submitted by client countries, and rarely with strings attached.3 STEMs, on the other
hand, were quickly shaping up as a direct precursor to U.S. counterinsurgency policy. As early as
1953, STEM officials were already considering initiatives like land reclamation projects that
would institute land reform favorable to peasant framers, and pacification projects stressing the
need for effective, indigenous rural defense forces to combat guerrilla warfare.4 Following formal
recognition of the Bao Dai regime on February 7, 1950, the U.S. had spent by 1952 over $50
million on these assistance projects, which included clothing refugees, fertilizer and malaria
programs. U.S. policy insisted on passing all funding directly to Bao Dai’s government, cultivating
further French distrust.5
Donald Heath, U.S. Ambassador to Indochina from 1952-1955, bore the brunt of defending
these policies to the French government; privately, he dissented. Heath wrote that the major
interest of the U.S. in Vietnam was to acquire “real estate: strategic position, rice, rubber, and tin,”
and in the process deprive the Communists of those resources.6 His view fit the growing
international narrative of American “cola-colonization.” It would later serve historians in arguing
that the U.S. initially became involved in Vietnam (and, for that matter, all of southeast Asia) as a
facet of the ever-expanding Pax Americana project; in the case of southeast Asia, primarily to
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shore up a reviving Japanese economy. Many American officials worried that without viable
markets in the region, Japan might turn towards Communist China as a potential trade partner.7
Though Heath’s comments appear prescient, they should be weighed with his thoughts
regarding the Indochina War as a whole. In the September 1953 edition of Life, he praised French
airmen and soldiers, dying “to prevent all of rich, strategic Southeast Asia from falling under
Communist domination,” for “fighting the good fight.” Clearly, Heath’s dissent was not a critique
of any U.S. intention to commodify Indochina, but a notion that perhaps France should be left to
conclude her war without the specter of “American machinations” forecasting her defeat. He did
use this same Life piece, though, to suggest that U.S. aid to the French forces in Indochina was
justified, especially given their supposed renewed offensive spirit under General Henri Navarre.8
Perhaps most telling are Heath’s thoughts on nationalism’s role in the Indochina War. The
ambassador believed communists in southeast Asia had used nationalism, a “phony catchword,”
well before the Viet Minh. He assured that most in Indochina, especially the Vietnamese, were
able to see past this deception and in response were joining the French forces.9 Robert Blum took
a less negative view of Indochinese nationalism; he believed it to be a real force, moreover one to
be harnessed. Looking back on his time in the country, Blum said, “[those of us supporting
STEMs] wanted to capture the nationalist movement from the Communists by encouraging the
national aspirations of the local populations and increasing popular support of their
governments.”10
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Increasingly, “the national aspirations of the local populations” came to be associated with
Edward Lansdale’s “common man” theory. Having made a name for himself advising Philippine
President Ramon Magsaysay’s successful resistance against the Communist Hukbalahap
insurgents in the early 1950’s, Col. Lansdale arrived in Indochina as an advisor on special counterguerrilla operations in 1953. He believed that the Vietnamese common man's “one real yearning
is to have something of his own, a farm, a small business, and to be left free to make it grow as he
wishes.”11 Blum believed that the failure of STEM operations and ECA aid during the Indochina
War were due to the U.S. “two-pronged policy” of supporting a former colonial power’s war, while
economically and politically reinforcing a populace potentially on its way towards independence.
The optics were bad, and Blum believed Americans in the eyes of the Vietnamese “came to be
looked upon more as a supporter of colonialism than as a friend of the new nation.”12 However,
with the French surrender at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954, it looked as though a new era of more
uniform policy in southeast Asia was dawning. The Geneva Conference that ensued divided
Vietnam at the 17th parallel, and Lansdale had a new government to work with in what was now
South Vietnam, one which claimed it wanted to help the Vietnamese “common man.”

Dividing Vietnam
Ngo Dinh Diem grew in popularity in the U.S. as criticism of the French aims in the
Indochina War mounted. During the war he was well known to the de facto “Vietnam Lobby,”
which in 1955 formally organized as the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) and included,
amongst other members, then-Senator John. F. Kennedy. Throughout the Indochina War, Kennedy
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restated his belief that, without promises of freedom, peoples of colonial territories would remain
hesitant to join with their imperial administrators to resist communism. In June 1956, at a New
York AFV conference entitled “America’s Stake in Vietnam,” Kennedy sang Diem’s praises for
delivering much needed progress in just two years. Diem’s government was stable and passing
legislation aimed at aiding poor farmers. It had supposedly rehabilitated nearly one million
Northern refugees. Schools had been built, and wells were being dug. In summary, Kennedy
declared, “Where once a playboy emperor ruled from a distant shore, a constituent assembly has
been elected.”13 Policymakers throughout the U.S. believed they had a democratic, stable,
receptive government in Saigon.
In fact, South Vietnam’s constituent assembly was only grudgingly convened by Diem
after much American insistence that he fulfill the will of his voters. During his years in power,
Diem would concentrate all power at the very top of his government, which consisted mostly of
his family and some senior military officials. Some officials in Washington considered Diem shy,
stubborn, and oblivious as his relations soured. U.S. ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge
Jr., later ambassador to South Vietnam, described Diem as prone to “pour[ing] out a babble of
words about something totally unrelated” to what he had just heard – especially when confronted
with American requests.14 This claim would serve as an allegory to Diem’s tenure: perpetually out
of touch, vigorously pursuing his own agenda, regardless of U.S. policy.
Diem had long worked to establish his anti-communist bona fides. In the mid-1920’s, he
was on the forefront of countering communist infiltration in rural villages of central Vietnam. He
rose quickly within the French-supported Bao Dai regime. By 1933 he had served in many
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appointment positions, including three months as the prestigious Minister of the Interior. He left
this government following disputes with the French leaders, arguing that Vietnamese should have
more say in their government. In 1945, he declined occupying Japan’s offer for the position of
prime minister following their decision to reinstall the Vietnamese monarchy under Bao Dai.15
Months later he again declined a leadership role in Vietnam, this time offered by Ho Chi Minh
who, following the Viet Minh’s August Revolution, was serving as the Premier of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh’s primary interest in Diem was likely to take advantage of his
Catholicism, as he believed Diem could serve as a rallying figure for Catholic Vietnamese who
had a reputation of being well-organized politically.16
Numerous historians have addressed the problem of Diem’s Catholicism, as he was to
eventually rule a Buddhist-dominated country. Religion, however, greatly aided his reception
when he and his brother traveled to the U.S. in 1950, as did praise from American diplomats in
Saigon. While U.S. policy at the time was to support France in Indochina, American advisors
privately foresaw a future of limited French influence in the region. As a reliably pro-American
figure, many believed he might call attention to the communist struggle in Vietnam while touring
the U.S. As a result, he was received by then-assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs
Dean Rusk. Together, Diem’s group and American officials toured robust examples of U.S.
industry and in conversations entertained the idea of creating a Vietnamese standing army with
American supplies.17
Following a year’s worth of travel, in 1951 Diem settled down in the northeast of the U.S.
For two years Diem lived in the Maryknoll Missions in Ossining, New York and Lakewood, New
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Jersey. It was then that the Eisenhower administration turned to him as South Vietnam’s new
leader. Returning in 1957 as president of Vietnam, Diem cast his time at Maryknoll as formative:
It is in this house that I brought into clear vision the principles on which I determined to
base my fight for my people. Here I drew up the principles which inspired the
Constitution of our nation … It is likewise through this house, and thanks to those who
lived here, that I made so many contacts with people throughout America, contacts which
have helped me so much in our struggle.18
Indeed, Maryknoll served as a base from where he urged dignitaries of the Catholic Church to
press Washington to support a free Vietnam. Known for receiving Holy Communion with the
Brothers every morning, Diem won over the clergy at Maryknoll. One Rev. Raymond A. Lane was
so enamored with Diem that, in December 1952 and January 1953, he wrote directly to a few of
his personal contacts – John Foster Dulles and General Douglas MacArthur, respectively – in an
effort to personally introduce the future leader.19
Diem eventually met with Democratic senators Mike Mansfield (another member of the
AFV, and eventually dubbed “Diem’s godfather” due to his considerable support for the man) and
John F. Kennedy.20 Both proved increasingly receptive to Diem’s anti-colonial, anti-communist
rhetoric. Following the stalemate of the Korean War, and in an atmosphere of McCarthyism,
Democrats were searching for opportunities to insist on their own anti-communist credentials.
Diem’s religion, education, and instinct to appeal to the U.S. would continue to win him support
in Washington following his return to Vietnam in 1953.
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Support in the U.S. still did not assure Diem the ultimate leadership role in Vietnam. In
June of 1954, a month after the French surrender at Dien Bien Phu, Diem accepted Bao Dai’s offer
to serve as Prime Minister of Vietnam’s new government. During the armistice which followed
the end of the war, the French made clear their distrust not only of Diem but more generally
American “intrusion” which they believed aimed to wrest control of the former colony. With U.S.
support, Diem would do just that. With the help of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (also known at the time
as the “Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club” due to their operational theater), Diem shipped over 800,000
Vietnamese refugees South under the pretense of “saving” them from communist North Vietnam.
The majority of these Vietnamese were Catholics, who formed a base for Diem to rule with in
South Vietnam.21
This transplanted base was wholly superfluous during the elections of October 23, 1955,
however, as Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Nhu sloppily rigged the vote to give Diem a whopping 98%
majority. In Saigon alone, Diem won over 133% of the voters. The election installed Diem as the
new country’s president, and did away with Bao Dai and the Vietnamese monarchy. With the new
government firmly in power, civic action and other counterinsurgency programs now seemed of
paramount importance, especially as the Geneva Conference of 1954 allowed free migration
between the two Vietnams. Throughout the year that followed, nearly 90,000 Viet Minh
sympathizers relocated North of the 17th parallel, many with explicit intentions of returning South
following elections to initiate the project of reunification. Many of these sympathizers also
threatened those who chose to remain, suggesting that supporters of the new American-backed
South Vietnamese government would face reprisals.22 Twelve days before the election, the border
between North and South Vietnam had been heavily sealed, Diem not even willing to permit a
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postal service arrangement with the North. Significant American aid to Diem now began to flow
in.
Civic Action cadre were one of the forces that Lansdale raised to stave off communist
insurgents in the Philippines. Meant to promote the government’s solidarity with populations in
remote and rural areas of the country, Civic Action cadres would engage agrarian communities
with village and hamlet infrastructure projects, provide assistance in medical administration and
farming, as well as provide defense in case of insurgent infiltration, and train others in self-defense.
Winning over the “hearts and minds” of these local populations would become a tenet of
counterinsurgency, as would the idea of “pacifying” these regions. Pacification was a project of
interlocking goals: it called for clearing the countryside of guerrilla forces and propagandists, but
also ensuring that the region’s resident populations actively resisted these subversives, as opposed
to taking neutral or supportive stances in the conflict. By eating, sleeping, and working with the
rural South Vietnamese (what Lansdale deemed the “Three Withs”), Civic Action cadres would
begin to accomplish rural pacification.23
While American advisors like Lansdale saw the rural population as something to be won
over, Diem’s primary concern was political control, particularly in urban centers. With the French
military entirely withdrawn by spring of 1956, in June Diem’s government abolished the elective
village administrative councils via memorandum. Diem’s Ministry of the Interior mandated that
villages, which had long operated autonomously, now extensively cooperate with the newlyformed Civil Guard and Civic Action forces and create new administrative committees responsible
directly to Saigon. A further Ordinance issued that October placed these new village chiefs directly
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under the president’s control. As part of his attempt to affect a “Personalist Revolution” under
himself in South Vietnam, Diem alone now appointed all rural leadership.24
That same year, Diem held constituent assembly elections and drafted a constitution for
what was now his Republic of South Vietnam. Power in South Vietnam was becoming highly
centralized under Diem’s regime, though not effectively, and at the expense of rural independence.
The regime intruded into these to suppress factionalism. It gave forces like Civic Action
responsibility for completing this work. That year it was estimated that the population of South
Vietnamese concentration camps stood at 20,000, containing not only communists, but locals of
note and members of religious sects deemed hostile to Diem.25 In 1957, Diem's controlling brother,
Ngo Dinh Nhu, assumed control of Civic Action. Already a divisive program, Civic Action became
part of Nhu's growing political-intelligence apparatus and associated primarily with harassment of
peasants.26
Nonetheless Civic Action cadres, about 2,000 strong beginning in 1956, worked to engage
peasants in previously held Viet Minh territories. They undertook projects ranging from education,
medicine disbursement, and census surveys to major road repairs and irrigation canals. Yet Civic
Action missions failed to implement major land reform, which American advisors believed was
the top priority. Following the 1954 Geneva Conference, surveys estimated that 2.5% of those
living in former Cochin China (a French designation referring to the Southern section of the
country, which included the fertile Mekong Delta) owned half of the cultivated land, while 70%
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owned less than 12.5%.27 Later estimates placed nearly half of the arable land in South Vietnam
in the hands of landowners holding 50+ hectares, with less than 13% allocated to smallholders.28
The Viet Minh had enjoyed great popularity in the countryside during the Indochina War
partly due to their support of peasants and hostile treatment of landlords. They derived wide
support from peasants due to a strikingly non-communist guarantee – that of private property.
Additionally, war correspondent Bernard Fall found that under Viet Minh control rice exports
quickly rejuvenated to their pre-World War II levels. In the post-cease fire years they quickly
dipped over half. Despite the bitter struggle that engulfed Vietnam during the Indochina War,
many poor Vietnamese likely felt some benevolence for the period and Viet Minh rule. In contrast,
under Diem’s reign, landlords returned with great power, as did taxes and exactions, forced labor,
and ultimately a class of landless poor, all reinforced by the reach of Civic Action cadres into rural
communities.29
Where Civic Action cadres did not pursue oppressive policies in the countryside, they
remained further ineffective due to their composition. Catholic refugees brought down from North
Vietnam in 1954 following the French surrender were favored for Civic Action service. These
refugees often spoke a different dialect than that of the South Vietnamese, were the recipients of a
costly government welfare and resettlement program, and were now forcing their anti-communist
messages upon previously-liberated villages. Essentially, they showcased the great divide between
the South Vietnamese government and its rural populace: as religious and cultural differences,
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compounded the government’s unwillingness to support or even identify with the majority of its
people.30

Unprepared for a War that Won’t Come
Even if the U.S. mission to South Vietnam was unaware of the damage being done by
specific Civic Action cadres, officials were beginning to understand that Diem’s policies were in
many ways a detriment to Vietnamese society. Elbridge Durbrow, Ambassador to South Vietnam
(1957-1961), after less than a year at his post, reported encountering “more and more grumblings
and expressions of discontent” for Diem amongst the Vietnamese people. In a December 1957
dispatch to the State Department, Durbrow and three other civilian officials31 from the U.S.
mission in Saigon prepared a report in which they leveled serious criticisms against Diem and his
governance. The already-limited capability of the South Vietnamese government, the four
contended, was severely hindered by Diem’s “suspiciousness and authoritarianism.” His
assumption of all responsibilities was evidently well-known, as was his authoritarian-esque
obsession with priming security forces at the expense of implementing “agrarian reform, laying
the foundations for industrial development, monetary reform, [and] building up an administrative
and technical base needed if only to implement [U.S.] aid programs.”32
The December report freely expressed what the mission believed were Diem’s enduring
advantages, but noted within the constituent assembly’s democratic bloc, “None of the so-called
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opposition leaders … have yet proven to have the quality of statesmen.” Durbrow indicated the
close relationship shared between Diem and General Williams, Commander of the U.S. Military
Assistance Advisory Group – Vietnam (MAAG) from 1955-1960, as yet another reason to temper
the criticisms with a begrudging respect for the South Vietnamese president. In hindsight, the
dispatch nonetheless indicates a potential conflict of interest within that relationship. Durbrow
acknowledged that Williams disagreed with the bulk of the dispatch. The general believed Diem
should continue focusing on building military forces as they were quite weak at the time. By
contrast Durbrow believed that Diem could move on numerous fronts, supporting military security
as well as rural development. At Williams’s request, the four moderated the report’s tone, but not
enough for Williams to embrace its conclusions. The discussion between Williams and Durbrow
preceding the dispatch was apparently quite heated, with Williams insisting that Americans must
not identify with Diem’s external critics.33
Williams, nicknamed “Hanging Sam” from his World War II days, had reason for pursuing
a policy focused primarily on building of the South Vietnamese army. In 1954, then-Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles outlined a policy of “massive retaliation” in response to communist
subversion throughout the developing world. The policy implied that, even in the case of a local
war, the U.S. might either threaten or even deploy nuclear weapons to achieve deterrence. Under
Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) revised the fundamentals of national security policy to
integrate nuclear weapons into the U.S. arsenal. Nuclear weapons would be used “in general war
and in military operations short of general war,” pursuant to presidential authorization.34
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The shift towards greater reliance on nuclear deterrence under Eisenhower should not be
construed as a no-holds-barred approach to communism in the developing world. Logic, though
guided by severe miscalculation, informed this shift. David Kaiser explains in American Tragedy
that U.S. policymakers since World War II had struggled with the concept of winning decisive
victories, especially in local wars, in arenas in which advantages of manpower would dwarf U.S.
technical superiority. In southeast Asia, this was especially the case. Moreover, following the
stalemate that concluded the Korean War, Americans resisted another land war in Asia,
particularly on the Chinese border. Nor did U.S. policymakers desire to provoke Communist
China’s direct military assistance to North Vietnam, a potential development they had been
worried about since as early as 1949, even before Korea. Finally, even if nuclear weapons proved
no more popular than deploying American troops to southeast Asia, they were cheaper than
deployments and a powerful deterrent.35
Marilyn Young in The Vietnam Wars and Michael Herring in America’s Longest War are
quick to point out that, within the U.S. military, the lessons of the Korean War were not learned.
Local communist insurrection and acts of terrorism in the South, in the minds of U.S. commanders,
could only be interpreted as signs of an impending North Vietnamese invasion. The U.S. military
believed that had been the case in Korea, where Korean communist insurgents had operated
independently from 1945-1950.36 Convinced these local insurgents could only be funded,
furnished, and directed by the North Vietnamese, Diem and Williams agreed that preparing the
South Vietnamese army for a massive war was the strategic decision going forward. So deep in
this mindset were Diem and Williams that they believed heightened insurgent activity to be merely
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a distraction, an attempt to “get the Army dispersed on security missions to prevent training” for
the impending invasion.37
As of July 1956, the invasion by North Vietnamese forces failed to materialize. The Geneva
Accords had mandated that elections to reunite the country be held within two years. At the time,
Washington had preferred no deadline, while the North Vietnamese had argued for elections as
early as six months after the cease fire. Appealing to the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference,
Great Britain and the Soviet Union, in the summer of 1956 the North Vietnamese hinted at renewed
military action if elections were not held. But with U.S. backing, Diem refused to budge, and by
August it seemed as though the danger had passed.
Rather than reassure the U.S. officials, this episode seems to have only heightened their
vigilance and resolve. At the end of August, the Eisenhower administration revised the U.S.
defense of South Vietnam (and Laos) from one of Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)
obligation to one of national security policy. If need be, the U.S. would defend South Vietnam
without the assistance of the obligated SEATO signatories.38
In the face of the potential July crisis in 1956, the Eisenhower administration had prepared
to augment South Vietnamese forces with specially trained U.S. ground forces and naval and air
atomic support.39 When the Geneva deadline passed without incident, the determination to raise a
strong South Vietnamese army only grew. This strategy reflected American conventional wisdom
of the era – as championed by Dulles – that a strong army was vital to develop a stable government
and deter communist ambitions. Beginning in 1956, U.S. economic and security assistance to
South Vietnam totaled nearly $300 million per year. In the period 1955-1961, the country would
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receive in total over $1 billion from the U.S., of which 78% was directed towards military
assistance. This figure did not include police training and direct equipment transfers; conversely,
only 2% of funds went to health, housing, and community development programs.40
As with much of the later counterinsurgency doctrine, overall U.S. thinking towards nation
building placed an undue emphasis on security over development. Williams, committed to
recreating an army similar to the one he served in during World War II, anticipated that the
Vietnamese conflict would indeed take the shape of a state-on-war involving regular forces and
open battles. Yet, the general could not ignore the deteriorating security situation within South
Vietnam. He once communicated to Diem that the “real danger lies in the local Viet Minh cadre,”
and that pacification programs required serious attention. Military journalist Thomas Ricks points
out that Williams’ successors, as well as the subsequent iterations of MAAG, would focus even
less on pacification programs and counterinsurgency practices recommended by other missions.
The U.S. military drew on its past experience rather than adapt to the peculiar circumstances it
encountered in Vietnam. In the face of growing insurgency, US advisors continued to pursue
traditional military doctrine.41
Williams’ recognition of growing internal threats was not an endorsement of civilian
mission operations, but of the need for paramilitary forces to supplement regular army units. The
Civil Guard force served that purpose, though throughout the late 1950’s the force was considered
impressive only in size. Over time, the training and administration of the Civil Guard served as a
sort of case study of the tensions between civil and military priorities. Without a doubt, members
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of civilian agencies recognized the need for paramilitary and military action; however, as security
in South Vietnam deteriorated, the military mission would emphasize security over pacification.
In the process, MAAG denied civilian agencies influence over internal security. As the military
mission pursued its own strategy, it inadvertently aided Diem’s enhancement of his grip over the
countryside, while abetting communist propaganda that looked to exploit the divisions in South
Vietnamese society.
The Civil Guard reform was yet another initiative that failed to fulfill its initial intent.
Second only to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in size and scope, the Civil Guard
was designed to patrol rural areas, collect intelligence, and serve as an armed, uniformed, full-time
mobile defense unit. Composed of scholars and public administration experts, the Michigan State
University Group (MSUG), which arrived in Vietnam in the summer of 1955, was charged with
training the then 50,000-strong Guard. The MSUG’s idea for the force, however, would soon prove
vastly different from that of Diem’s.
The MUSG initially believed the Guard should be “a civilian police in every respect …
apart from any military encampments, directed and instructed by the civilian personnel on civilian
matters.” The MSUG also called for the whole of the National Police apparatus to be “so trained
and distributed that they will very soon popularize themselves with the populace through extra
services and courtesies.” This goal would be best accomplished, the Group argued, by a reduction
in force of about 50% and an effort to settle the Guard units in villages. By doing this, the families
of the Guard, settled alongside the units, could contribute to the Guard’s “popularization” through
work within the villages.42 Further, settling Civil Guard units should have in theory increased their
mobility and response time.
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That was not the case. Province chiefs, who controlled Guard units, were now responsible
to the Ministry of the Interior and, really, the President. They functioned separately and lacked
coordination. In order to cross into a new province when responding to a threat, Guard units needed
the approval of the neighboring province chief. That left units uncoordinated and slow to respond
to threats within their own province or even more in neighboring provinces. Central barrack
housing further isolated them from the province’s villages. Communist infiltrators learned to seize
major opportunities when the units retired for the evening. By basing smaller units within the
villages and creating a central command accessible to the province chiefs, the Civil Guard would
become much more effective.43
In November of 1955 Diem had moved control of the Civil Guard from the Ministry of the
Interior to the Presidency, likely to tout greater coordination of the forces while in reality to
increase his control of the countryside. Diem had originally been suspicious of the Civil Guard
units, as they were often composed of illiterates as well as those who had resisted his rule in
paramilitary units following the 1954 Geneva Conference. The Guard had also at first represented
a formidable threat to this control; it was larger than all of his police forces combined, and not
under his personal control.44
By 1957, however, Diem had apparently found new utility in the mobile forces. Now
believing the 54,000-strong45 Civil Guard units worked well in keeping young and energetic
Vietnamese loyal to his regime, Diem wanted to maintain the strength of the force so as to augment
his military forces (limited by the Geneva Accords) to 150,000. In July of 1957, Diem’s
government requested $60 million in heavy equipment including bazookas, helicopters, and
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armored vehicles for the Civil Guard. This dwarfed MAAG’s proposed expenditures of $18
million and the MSUG’s of $14 million.46 When Diem and the MSUG clashed in their plans, Diem
began to use the force as “a dumping ground for inferior army officers.”47
The MSUG had arrived in Vietnam under the directorship of Dr. Wesley Fishel, a supporter
and close friend of Diem. But after three years in the country, Fishel returned to the U.S. From that
point on, the MSUG’s influence waned in all security matters advisory and administrative; the
Civil Guard simply proved to be its most evident representation of decline. Not prepared for an
ideological battle veiled in budgetary requests, after June 30, 1959 the Public Safety Division of
the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM, sometimes referred to as U.S. Overseas Mission as well)
assumed control of Civil Guard training. The arrangement did not last long. In late 1960 the
responsibility of Civil Guard training again changed hands, this time over to the MAAG, no doubt
a comfort to Williams, who had always seen the MSUG as “police types who don’t see the big
picture.”48 The force which Lansdale had called “pathetically unready for the realities of the
Vietnamese countryside”49 would now receive better equipment.
Even as the Kennedy administration bolstered the Civil Guard in its new military posture,
its remained ineffective. Similarly, the incoming administration’s strategy for rural development
would be largely drawn from development during the Eisenhower years. And again, like the Civil
Guard, rural development would be criticized for its ineffectiveness, would become more militant
to compensate for perceived issues of security, and would remain ineffective over time.
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Uprooting the Garden State
Responding to calls for land reform, in 1955 Diem limited individual land holdings to 100
hectares (247 acres). The national then faced the great task of redistributing the oversize plots
amongst smallholders. It did so at a lackluster pace; two years after Diem’s proclamation,
somewhere between 3.5-5% had been allotted to fewer than 19,000 farmers.50 Such limited
measures did not usher in any new age of prosperity, as many Vietnamese peasants simply
transitioned from paying onerous rents to incurring vast loans owed to the national government.
To pay these loans, which were strictly enforced, peasants were forced to sell what little produce
and livestock that did belong to them. Many were even forced to purchase land awarded to them
by the Viet Minh prior to the division of the country.51 Frances Fitzgerald argues that traditional
Vietnamese views of land did not include a concept of “private property,” but instead embraced a
loose “trusteeship” system.52 Under Diem's rule, rural populations confronted the consequences of
privatized property, a concept which quickly took on a negative connotation.
It must be noted that Diem never intended to undertake true land reform. In this instance,
he did little more than attempt to convince his American critics that he stood for the common
man’s betterment. Historians have pointed out that in all of these ‘land schemes,’ Diem manifested
his lack inability (and unwillingness) to identify with the Vietnamese peasant farmer. Yet Marilyn
Young in The Vietnam Wars makes a further point, that indeed many of the measures that placed
landlords back in power were not implemented simply out of cruel misunderstanding. Always
fearful of the countryside, Diem’s government maintained landlords as a method of keeping
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control in provinces in which their presence was weak or wavering. Unquestioningly, landlords
brought oppression that Diem undoubtedly believed a small price to pay for rural stability.53
With this in mind, Diem’s rural initiatives should be identified as what they were: various
methods of imposing order on rural populations. The agroville, launched in February of 1959, was
another land scheme his government undertook although only in a sanitized form. In fact, among
the experimental resettlement programs Diem’s government launched between 1956-1960, it was
the largest. Agrovilles forcibly relocated nearly one million peasants into planned communities,
equipped with electricity, schools, medical facilities, and other amenities. In practice, peasants
received a frightfully small subsidy with which to build their new homes – Diem called this the
“community development principle.” American policymakers, whether deceived or self-deluding,
actually found promise in the planned communities, or at the very least a whiff of gumption in
Diem’s scheme. The defects in the scheme forced the government to terminate the program by
1960. Before its termination, however, agrovilles had displaced hundreds of thousands of peasants
and provoked their bitter discontent.54 One communist leader remembers an outpour of his village
who, faced with government mandates to tear down their houses and relocate, said, “If we’re going
to die, we’re going to die right here, we’re not going anywhere.”55
Even so, Diem’s vision inspired U.S. civilian policymakers. In 1959, Kenneth Young,
Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs in the State Department, visited South Vietnam
at Diem’s request to survey the government’s rural development programs in action. Subsidies to
South Vietnamese farmers encouraged them to grow crops like sweet potatoes, cocoa, coffee, and
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tobacco so as to increase the country’s market diversity, but also in an attempt to curtail the
population’s heavy reliance on rice. Living conditions improved modestly as villagers received
access better schools and medical services, and were able to herd more livestock. Young attributed
much of this improvement to “the crucial role of the bulldozer and tractor in clearing the way” for
the new resettlement areas. The resettlement projects were ostensibly designed to aid farmers in
retaining land and producing more effectively, which Diem hoped would serve his ultimate goal
of building political loyalty in the countryside. Meanwhile, the modified geography of the areas
deprived the insurgents of favorable territory and easy access to villages. With forests bulldozed,
communists would be easily detectable, and guerrilla warriors forced to go on the offensive.56
Under the guise of “urbanism,” Diem collected scattered rural families on fertile grounds
in new village centers. Young, after a rural inspection trip, bought into much of Diem’s policies
and emphasized the president’s “imaginative conception and rapid execution” of the resettlements.
In what reads as a reflective moment, Young recalled,
He showed me the plan for this new village, pointing out where the new houses, the
market, the church, the canals and the roads would be located. From the tower where we
stood surveying the scene in all directions, he could visualize for me an attractive new
town and a new arrangement of life along the canals in this lush green delta. He remarked
later that this whole area would be transformed into a “Garden State, like New Jersey”.
Regarding agrovilles, Young had little to say: “Unfortunately, it was a good idea poorly begun …
But with less compulsion and better public relations it may be resumed with success.”57
Young’s report contained much original thinking as well. It described his own rural
development ideas, which in many ways built off of Diem’s. “Compound communities” or “village
clusters,” as Young called them, would be circles of villages which sprouted hamlets and further
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connected to make one large circle. Keeping these large communities connected would serve the
purpose of “agrimetro,” the concept of implanting new rural villages and vitalizing old ones.
Villages and their subsidiary hamlet clusters would be connected by small roads to create an “agrocenter.” Services found in these agro-centers would range from bus terminals and marketplaces to
vocational training institutes and chopper pads in an attempt, all-encompassing in serving Young’s
conception of the needs of the modern compound community. Key to Young’s plans were radio
communications at road intersections, enabling defense forces to quickly respond to insurgent
crises.58
Even if these specific schemes failed to take shape, the Diem regime clearly needed to
address the organization of rural populations for security purposes at least in conjunction with the
improvement of their living standards. Like all advisors to Saigon in the late 1950’s, Young was
increasingly concerned with improving responses to insurgent attacks. Following the Geneva
Accords, though most Viet Minh soldiers and cadres moved north of the 17th parallel, about 10,000
remained in South Vietnam. Those left behind undertook a campaign of agitation and propaganda.
Pictures of Ho Chi Minh and copies of the Geneva Agreements began to appear in rural
households. By 1957, communist guerrilla attacks were swiftly on the rise. The year began with
heavy ARVN-guerrilla clashes in the Mekong Delta. It was around this time that Diem dubbed
these guerrilla warriors ‘Viet Cong’ (VC), a slang name for Vietnamese Communists. Armed
assaults by the VC, as well as assassinations and kidnappings of local government officials, village
chiefs, and local militiamen became commonplace. The year prior, North Vietnam had decided to
focus primarily on ‘building socialism’ at home, and supported the VC more in spirit than with
resources.59
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Early CIA reports the following year placed the guerrillas’ strength at about 1,700, nearly
double what Williams had estimated only months prior. Against the MAAG Commander’s
judgement, Diem in 1958 launched major military offensives against the VC. Though the enemy
often remained elusive or easily retreated across the nation’s western borders, that year the ARVN
dealt serious blows to VC forces, and moreover to communist morale, as party membership in
South Vietnam rapidly declined. Still, the Diem government experienced insurgent setbacks
throughout 1958. In August, guerrilla warriors mustered a force of nearly 400 men and raided a
poorly-defended Michelin Rubber Plantation north of Saigon. They made off with weapons and
millions of Vietnamese piasters, and in the process dealt a swift blow to the South Vietnamese
government. In the wake of the raid, the ARVN appeared deeply inept, while Diem himself was
left “deeply perturbed,” having visited the site less than a week prior.60
The guerrillas decided to renew their offensive in 1959 with new battalions and companies.
In January of that year, the Communist Party in North Vietnam had moved to officially endorse
the violent overthrow of Diem. By the summer, specially-trained insurgents were moving south of
the border by way of Laos. This infiltration was significant as, until 1959, the fiercest fighters in
South Vietnam had been sect bands, partisans who often collaborated on offensives but ruled
wholly different provinces.61 In the second half of 1959, the number of assassinations of
government officials, village notables, and police officers doubled from those of less than a year
prior. Hamlets spontaneously rebelled against GVN forces throughout the Mekong Delta, and as
ARVN retreats increased, so too did the number of weapons captured by VC guerrillas – over
1,000 in one month alone during 1960. Northern support compounded the prevailing chaos in the
South, and as 1960 approached, the growth of the insurgent crisis within the country was apparent.
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As attacks grew bolder throughout the year, the government in North Vietnam was forced
to take notice. Hoping to foster some sense of control of the insurgency in the South, in September
1960 the Central Committee in Hanoi voiced its support for the formation of a coalition aimed at
liberating South Vietnam. Two months later, at a secret base just 60 miles outside of Saigon, the
National Liberation Front (NLF) was formed. In February 1961, Hanoi’s leadership became
further entwined with the VC’s growing organization and dominance of the Mekong Delta.62

The Paramount Consideration
Before Vietnam was an American war, it was a French war; yet within the Indochina War
one already finds the clash of civilian and military policies, both of which may have hindered the
success of the other. Waging war and winning hearts and minds would prove all the more
challenging when pursued concurrently, what Blum dubbed the impractical “Two-Pronged
Policy.” Blum and de Lattre clashed over their operations, which pursued different goals. As the
doctrine of counterinsurgency was established during the Kennedy administration, the goals of the
U.S. civilian and military missions to Vietnam would be merged, in theory to assure the ability for
both to flourish. Apparent within the 1950’s, however, is the predominate concern for security
over economic development in pacifying rural populations.
At the end of 1957, Williams consoled himself because the VC “lack[ed] sufficient
strength” and “a popular base.”63 How wrong he was. The VC would achieve some of their greatest
successes in the years leading up to 1960. The U.S. military advisors in Vietnam proved themselves
unprepared for this form of guerrilla warfare, and though they attempted to adapt under Kennedy,
Sam Williams had already surrendered too much ground to the NLF. The Eisenhower
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administration, while prepared for swift, “massive retaliation,” did not plan warfare on a scale
suited for the realities of the country. Though an invasion form the North did not come to pass,
MAAG’s obsessive view that Hanoi was deeply entrenched in the South stunted the growth of
effective counterinsurgency training and tactics.
The civilian mission of the era proved equally unprepared. Where it recognized the impact
of Diem’s severe repression, it was ineffective in changing his ways; where it did not make this
crucial recognition, it found wholly too much promise in the man. As Kenneth Young implored in
his report, “the task now is for everyone to rally around President Diem.” Even in the face of
Diem’s major shortcomings, Young felt that the president’s energy for action could be channeled
into strategic avenues. Uprooting rural peasants, though potentially traumatic, could ultimately
serve “a long-run job of social chemistry,” fortifying South Vietnam’s borders with modern, loyal
villages. These new policies could build “psychological momentum,” something Young felt was
much needed as the decade came to a close.64
Both Diem’s policies and Young’s ideas for rural development required massive relocation
of families, antagonizing a society in which land was the family’s “sacred, constant element.”65
Future civilian initiatives aimed at fortifying and winning over rural populations would attempt to
avoid massive relocations, and fail. It should be noted that Young’s report was delivered to Walt
Rostow, Deputy Special Assistant to President Kennedy, less than a month in office. Young, like
many at the time, had read Rostow’s work (his most well-known being The Stages of Economic
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto) with much enthusiasm. As the Kennedy administration
ushered in the 1960’s with its pursuit of “hearts and minds,” development in South Vietnam
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appeared an excellent arena to build on Rostow’s Non-Communist Manifesto. This became all the
more important when Department of Defense studies found that VC fighters and the NLF saw
themselves as legitimate rulers of a free country. Insurgent support in the South was supposedly
bolstered by their responses to the desires of peasants, which were not limited to wanting only
“something of [their] own … and to be left free.”66
Throughout the Diem government’s tenure, American oversight bore primary
responsibility for the failure of rural development in South Vietnam. While the U.S. poured
funding into the country, the Saigon mission and Washington failed to employ (or possess)
leverage over Diem. But under Kennedy, a new failure emerged. The goals of the military and
civilian missions became intertwined: a pacified, developed rural community would render an area
safe for military operations, while effective paramilitary forces would be necessary to establish a
community prepared to undergo development. Ultimately, though these merged initiatives within
the doctrine of counterinsurgency may have suggested an increase in combined civilian and
military operations, in fact military security took precedence over civilian wellbeing. Speaking to
Ambassador Durbrow in February of 1960, Williams made evident that he and other high-level
military commanders did not see development as essential to counterinsurgency:
The truth is that the population of South Vietnam, like any other, is more responsive to
fear and force than to an improved standard of living. The conclusion is clear: The
paramount consideration is to gain and maintain a superiority of force in all parts of the
country. This is done by developing the military and police potential as the most urgent
objective of our national program in Vietnam.67
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Chapter 2: Security First
Despite Sam Williams’ retirement from service in 1960, the former MAAG commander’s
opinions remained influential throughout the decade that followed. His outlook regarding the
“truth” about South Vietnam’s population – that fear, engendered by effective military control,
would prevail over improved standards of living – would continue to weaken the appeal U.S.
policies made toward winning their “hearts and minds.” During the Kennedy administration, the
goals of the military and civilian missions would be merged under a doctrine of counterinsurgency.
However, the issue of security would be the utmost priority, in effect encouraging Diem’s rural
repression while rendering U.S. civilian initiatives ineffective. The military mission had long
desired to prosecute a war on its terms. As that war continued to evade them, many chose to
undermine civilian mission operations, either by activity or apathy.
The example of the Civil Guard is salient. Following the 1957 Civil Guard budget dispute
(in which civilian and military actors seemed to be in general agreeament regarding the forces’
funding and furnishing), the military mission became increasingly critical of civilian operations.
As assassinations in the countryside rose at frightening rates, so too did the military mission’s
notion that pursuing ‘hearts and minds’ was a waste of time. This line of thinking likely prompted
the wresting of the Civil Guard’s training and equipping from U.S. civilian agencies in 1960. In
Rural Pacification in Vietnam, then-USAID official William Nighswonger, referencing classified
interviews with members of his own agency as well as the Department of Defense, reported that
personnel from MAAG and others even higher in the U.S. command deliberately obstructed the
USOM in arming the Civil Guard in late 1960.1
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Nighswonger wrote that Diem’s vision for the Civil Guard was a “hard-hitting mobile force
(on wheels) that would be heavily armed and organized in larger units.”2 Lansdale wanted to see
the forces improve, as did both U.S. missions involved with its training, equipping, and budget
allocation. Yet considering his admiration for Mao’s guerilla teachings, that subversives were bestsuited moving throughout the people “as a fish swims in the sea,” it’s hard to imagine how the
ostensibly-invasive Civil Guard forces, now trained by the U.S. military and soon to be armed with
choppers and bazookas, would be able to effectively “eat, sleep, and work” with the people.
Marilyn Young writes that as the Civil Guard forces and Civic Action teams were further removed
from civilian control, they became increasingly associated with Diem’s countryside repression and
thus ineffective in convincing Vietnamese that their government was worth supporting.3 Countless
historians have suggested this bolstered Communist recruitment efforts: as one peasant explained,
“Everywhere [Diem’s] army came … they made more friends for the V.C.”4
Still, the U.S. military mission’s apathy towards and activity which contributed to the
erosion of civilian policies did not indicate malice as much as a fundamental disregard for nonsecurity priorities. For example, William Westmoreland, later commander of Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964-1968, tended to regard the Vietnamese people “more as
an impediment than as a prize.” Those both below and before Westmoreland felt similarly; he was
“hardly alone.”5 Whereas high commanders of the war were largely distanced from the reality of
the conflict, lower brass officials were all too aware of the Vietnamese they advised and eventually
fought alongside. In some way or another, most members of the U.S. military mission were likely
encouraged to think of the Vietnamese inherently as obstacles in South Vietnam. The ruling family
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certainly fostered this sentiment. For example, the Self Defense Corps (SDC), the lowliest of
volunteer fighters often composed of aged peasant farmers forcibly converted into militiamen,
were severely undervalued as they were not deemed the gatekeepers of the Diem regime’s security.
Neil Sheehan, in A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, writes that,
Most casualties in defensive actions were also inflicted on the SDC militiamen who
manned the posts. The Ngo Dinhs were not troubled by the deaths of these peasants …
They could be replaced by other peasant hirelings at the equivalent of $10 a month …
Diem thought so little of them that he did not allow wounded militiamen to be treated in
military hospitals.6
If not faced with the blatant depreciation of low-level indigenous forces, U.S. military personnel
interacted with ARVN forces, a poorly organized, often apathetic or cowardly regular army who
through their own shortcomings drew U.S. advisors into armed conflict with superior guerrillas.
Finally, as Vietnamese civilians embodied the enveloping sea in which guerillas covertly swam,
all became suspect. Ultimately, and largely due to the American-backed Diem government, the
U.S. military mission to South Vietnam would never value the Vietnamese in the way that the
civilian mission did. Not inundated with the “hearts and minds” philosophy, winning over the
Vietnamese was simply not a salient objective to the U.S. military.
Eight days into office, in 1961 President Kennedy responded to an appeal from Diem to
increase the forces of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). In authorizing an aid increase of
$41 million and a troop increase of 20,000, Kennedy's administration sought to move South
Vietnamese forces from the defensive to the offensive. Of the $41 million, $28.4 was specifically
allocated to the Civil Guard.7 Such an allocation was sure to divert human and capital resources
from economic development initiatives. In Kennedy’s Vietnam, the issue would always remain
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security; defense would always be deficient and in need in order for economic development to
advance. By tying both initiatives together within one doctrine, the Kennedy administration
doomed development. Meanwhile, their military proliferation within a corrupt, unaware South
Vietnamese government would lose them hearts, minds, and territory in the countryside,
warranting only more military action.
!
Beef-Up & Delaying the Doctrine
When President Kennedy assumed office on January 20, 1961, U.S. diplomacy focused on
the Soviet Union. Global tensions, especially at potential flashpoints such as Berlin, were rising.
Only two weeks prior to Kennedy's inauguration, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had delivered
a speech in which he promised to support “wars of national liberation” throughout the world. In
order for the Soviet Union to achieve economic superiority, it was vital, the premier concluded,
that they supported these struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, zones which Khrushchev
deemed “active fronts.” These fronts were also the epicenters of revolutions against imperialist
powers that, with aid from socialist states, were slowly gaining victories.8
Special assistant to the president Arthur Schlesinger recalled that Kennedy read excerpts
of Khrushchev's speech to his first meeting of the National Security Council.9 Khrushchev’s
speech weighed on his mind. Yet whatever its immediate impact on Kennedy, it served only to
accentuate concerns the new president had long held, about “limited brush fire wars, indirect nonovert aggression, intimidation and subversion, [and] internal revolution,” tactics through which
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“[t]he periphery of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away.”10 Kennedy quickly translated his
concerns into a strategy for resisting insurgency. The subsequent transition from executive
preoccupation into government policy was complete by early February with the brief National
Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) no. 2: “Development of Counter-Guerrilla Forces.” Those
closest to Kennedy were charged with publically elaborating his doctrine.11
In June of that year, then Deputy Special Assistant to the president Walt Rostow delivered
a speech at Fort Bragg on “Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas.” Having authored the
non-communist manifesto, the former MIT professor worked to tie the phenomenon of communist
insurgency to the lack of development within the countries under siege. Dubbed the “Rostovian
modernization theory” in some circles, it prescribed that democratic capitalist countries were
better-suited to economically “take-off” than their Communist counterparts. Rostow warned that
insurgents looked to exploit underdeveloped regions as they moved towards modernization.
Furthermore, he felt that U.S. policy needed to effectively respond by depriving insurgents of the
countryside in which they found cover, mainly the rural villages and forests populated by often
apolitical populations. This would require “not merely a proper military program of deterrence but
programs of village development, communications, and indoctrination.” Rostow stressed a
proactive policy, arguing the best way to fight a guerrilla was to outright prevent it.12
Roger Hilsman, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State
Department, further developed Rostow’s discussion of counterinsurgency. Writing in “Internal
War: The New Communist Doctrine” in August 1961, Hilsman focused primarily on the reform
of defense tactics, arguing that the U.S. missions aboard would need “radical changes in
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organization, combat doctrine and equipment” to repel and contain insurgency. Training would
call for small, indigenous defense forces, and while regular forces were essential in regular military
tasks, guerrilla warfare would prove anything but regular. Conventional forces relied too much on
heavy armaments and excessive firepower, as well as the space and means to maneuver it. Hilsman
claimed that this often led to an “erroneous stress on holding land rather than destroying enemy
forces.”13
Rostow and Hilsman both had the ear of the president. Considering their backgrounds and
statements on counterinsurgency, it would appear as though the two should not be considered
uniform voices on the subject. Yet the two took different paths to arrive at the same conclusions.
Hilsman viewed guerrilla warfare strictly in terms of subversion, indicative of an outside force’s
attempt to gain power. Though development was key to Hilsman’s ideas concerning
counterinsurgency, his policy of resistance to subversion was a process, in which development
came after security. Viewed through the lens of economics, Rostow saw insurgency as more a
symptom of the disease that was a lack of development, visited upon countries especially in an
atmosphere of international communism. To Rostow, development was preventative; however, in
the meantime, guerrillas could not be dealt with using the carrot, but the stick. Neither saw
economic development as the lynchpin of success in South Vietnam.
While the new administration worked to define their counterinsurgency doctrine,
insurgents within South Vietnam continued to amass control. In late 1961, the People’s Liberation
Armed Force (PLAF), organized only in February, was 17,000-strong. U.S. intelligence reported
that these numbers grew significantly throughout the remainder of the year, roughly 10,000 by the
start of 1962. Heavy attacks, executions, and the takeover of a provincial capital just 50 miles
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outside Saigon in September of 1961 were cause for even Walt Rostow to seriously consider the
deployment of U.S. troops. The Diem regime seemed again at serious risk. ARVN morale had also
become a common discussion topic. They continuously ceded territory to the NLF when they chose
to embark on ineffective patrols; often times they simply remained in their barracks. When they
did venture into the countryside, they encountered sniper fire, and in their retreat, they left weapons
for the VC to recover. As the terror increased, the isolation of rural populations was compounded
by the flight of rich families into South Vietnamese cities. These poorer populations were easy
recruits.14
Dispatched to find the truth in an atmosphere of seeming chaos, Walt Rostow and General
Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the JCS, reported back to Kennedy in November and confirmed the
bad news. The joint report perceived a “defeatist outlook” amongst the ARVN ranks, and more
generally a “deep and pervasive crisis of confidence and a serious loss in national morale.” The
report recommended an increase in U.S. military advisors, as well as more comprehensive aid to
address not only military shortcomings but natural disasters. Notably, the joint report proposed the
dispatch of an 8,000-strong “logistical task force.” This group would be comprised of engineers,
medical groups, and forces attached to secure their operations. A seemingly moderate form of
intervention, Taylor saw the force as most productive in its symbolism, representing the
commitment of the U.S. to South Vietnam. Many military advisors believed this potential was
stifled by Diem’s unwillingness to place American combat troops alongside his own.
The Taylor-Rostow dispatch grew out of concessions made by the president a month
earlier. On October 9, the JCS had approached Kennedy and recommended the dispatch of 12,000
American troops to the Central Highlands of South Vietnam in order to block Communist
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infiltration routes. Two days later, reporting on the whole of Southeast Asia, Deputy
Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson proposed a dispatch of 20,000-25,000 to the region for
the same purpose.15 Giving in to his advisors, in National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM)
no. 104 Kennedy authorized the dispatch of the covert ‘Jungle Jim’ squadron to train Vietnamese
forces and assist in counterinsurgency operations. Comprised of less than 300 men and a token
amount of transports, bombers, and fighter jets, the dispatch would serve purely logistical
purposes: it would be no show of U.S. force. Simultaneously, Kennedy finally approved of
Rostow’s proposed fact-finding mission, likely hoping that he and Taylor would return with
proposals other than an increase of U.S. personnel in the country. Confiding in Schlesinger,
Kennedy had once expressed his doubts on committing paltry amounts of troops:
The troops will march in; the bands will play; the crowds will cheer … and in four days
everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told we have to send in more troops. It’s
like taking a drink. The effect wears off, and you have to take another.16
The president rejected Taylor’s “logistical task force” proposal, aiming chiefly to avoid any
dispatch that would indicate an overt show of American military force.17
Kennedy’s restraint was driven by foreign as well as domestic concerns. The failure at the
Bay of Pigs in April of 1961 had placed his administration at odds with Republican and right-wing
Democrat lawmakers. As they charged the administration with weakness and indecision, they
implied that the U.S. needed to take a firm stance against communism elsewhere in the world.
Kennedy’s cabinet agreed that Vietnam was to be that arena, though in 1961 there was no
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consensus on the amount or nature of force necessary to hold this line. Privately, Kennedy
questioned any deployment proposal from a political, strategic, and moral point of view.18
His reluctance that year culminated in Project Beef-Up, which would dramatically increase
the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam throughout the rest of his presidency. Beef-Up
ostensibly handed more responsibilities to the forces of South Vietnam, primarily the ARVN and
Civil Guards. These ranged from increased maritime operations to medical training and the
construction of hospitals. Yet with these new responsibilities came new oversight. Though the
ARVN would now be responsible for greater intelligence collection, they would do so in greater
conjunction with the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). More U.S. aircraft and
communication equipment appropriated to the country’s defense forces necessitated more training.
Napalm was added to the GVN’s arsenal, though in theory it could only be deployed with
Vietnamese pilots at the controls. U.S. advisors would start accompanying South Vietnamese
forces in greater numbers, increasing the chances that they’d see action. And though Kennedy
publically downplayed the fact, advisers were now authorized to participate in said combat.19
When Kennedy took office, there were 800 military personnel serving in South Vietnam.
By the end of 1961, there were just over 3,000 in the country. Within a year that number would
triple, and by Beef-Up’s completion in the fall of 1963, it would reach over 16,000. U.S. military
oversight was to become remarkably visible in South Vietnam. The middle ground to a military
intervention, albeit temporary, had been found; meanwhile, the developmental aspect of
counterinsurgency was largely absent.20
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In fact the whole doctrine of counterinsurgency was neither defined nor implemented that
year. This should come as no surprise, given what appeared to be the crisis that was South Vietnam
in 1961. While VC casualties remained constant throughout the year (and sometimes dipped
month-to-month), those of GVN forces steadily climbed. In October alone, GVN forces suffered
more than twice as many casualties as they had in January. Similarly, VC acts of sabotage,
terrorism, and open attacks increased throughout the year. Though the U.S. aimed to make itself
more visible in 1962, the year had been lost to the VC, emboldened by American wavering and a
‘defensive outlook’ which Taylor claimed infected nearly 85% of South Vietnamese forces.21
Counterinsurgency, and especially its tenet of development, would have to vie for attention against
the backdrop of a deteriorating military situation.

River Man
1961 was the year in which Vice President Lyndon Johnson became acquainted with the
war in Vietnam. Kennedy saw in Johnson a potential political adversary; he was set on keeping
him on his side, but feared giving the vice president too much power. Eventually, though, Kennedy
professed he didn’t know what to do with the man at all: “I cannot stand Johnson’s damn long
face. He just comes in, sits at the Cabinet meetings with his face all screwed up, never says
anything. He looks so sad.” An aide then suggested the new president send Johnson “on an aroundthe-world trip … [to] build up his ego, let him have a great time.” Kennedy loved the “damn good
idea,” and that spring sent Johnson to Africa and Asia. He would serve the Kennedy administration
as a “goodwill ambassador.”22
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In April, while in Dakar, Johnson made a show in handing out ballpoint pens and lighters,
inscribed “L.B.J.,” to poor villagers. The next month he traveled to Asia, and generated even larger
headlines from Saigon, where he passionately declared Diem “the Winston Churchill of Asia.”23
Johnson’s meeting with Diem significantly factored into his thoughts on Vietnam going forward.
The vice president resisted speaking to reporters who decried the many problems of the Diem
regime. Johnson believed Diem was America’s man in Saigon: there was no other to go with, and
the U.S. was better off providing him what he needed. Later, as president, Johnson weighed heavily
the Kennedy administration’s abandonment of Diem when reassuring new Saigon governments.
In Saigon, Johnson promoted development. Speaking to South Vietnam’s National
Assembly, Johnson implored those present to
find among yourselves those dedicated men and women who want to heal the sick, those
citizens who would bridge the rivers and erect the dams, those patriots who would bring
your nation together with roads, those citizens who would establish factories of modern
industry, those countrymen who would put brain and hand to your good earth in order that
it may be more fruitful. Find the young people who, unafraid, will dedicate their lives to
the building of a free and prosperous Vietnam.
The vice president, a New Dealer at heart, truly believed in the power of public works programs
to lift agrarian societies into the modern age and, through industrial means, increase efficiency and
prosperity. He was also aware of the current buzz around development, including Rostow’s “takeoff” theory. Johnson saw America’s role in helping nations make those first, vital steps: “We have
faith – a growing faith – in Vietnam and the strength you can build here. We want to work beside
you in the great works of the future for your people.”24
Johnson saw development as an opportunity for international cooperation as well as
modernization. At its peak, he theorized, development in Asia could even bring together regional
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adversaries and make them allies. During his trip to Asia, Johnson also stopped in Bangkok,
headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). At
ECAFE, Johnson delved into the possibilities development held, and touted one project in
particular: the development of the Mekong Delta. A UN press release from the visit describes the
project the international community envisioned in 1961:
The Mekong project calls for irrigation, power, navigation and fisheries development of
an area of 17 million population. It provides, among other things, for three multipurpose
dams on the main stream of the Mekong River, four dams on four tributaries (the
Bettanang in Cambodia, the Nam Ngum in Laos, the Nan Pong in Thailand, and the
Upper Se San in Vietnam), and the improvement of navigation on the entire course of the
river, from Luangprabang (Laos) to the sea.
Unfortunately for Johnson, he found the Mekong project in the data-collection stage. ECAFE
Executive Secretary U Nyun assured Johnson that this meant “action in the real sense,” and pointed
out that $9 million worth of aid for the project had been given or pledged by 12 countries and
several international agencies.25
Though no doubt delighted with the nations pledged to development, Johnson had to have
noticed that (with the exception of China) the nations listed were all allied with the U.S. in the
Cold War. The vice president wanted to challenge the international order in the development of
the Mekong. His language on cooperation in the region is revealing: he believed “if [Thailand,
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam] could work together on a river, they could work together on
anything else.”26 He chose not to recognize a partitioned Vietnam in discussing the development
of the Mekong, believing that an objective international success in his mind would be shared by
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minds within both blocs. And he believed he possessed the vision to carry the project forward. As
the Executive Secretary presented to the U.S. delegation on the progress of the project, “Mr.
Johnson interrupted the Executive Secretary [of ECAFE], rose from his chair, put his hands in his
pockets, jingled some solver coins,” and said, “You know, Mr. Secretary, I am a river man. All
my life I have been interested in rivers and their developments.” Johnson re-emphasized the need
for getting the project under way to the stage of construction “as soon as possible.”27
The Mekong is one the most fertile regions in the Indochinese peninsula. Within South
Vietnam’s borders, it was also one of the most active zones of guerrilla warfare and U.S.
counterinsurgency programs. In 1960 alone, over 800 uprisings took place within the Delta.28
Because of the strategic importance of the Mekong, development would prove hard to accomplish
as the war intensified. Possibly as a result, the project was further hindered by a bureaucratic phase
which many thought signaled concrete progress. Though the inaugural phase of the project
appeared to be nearing its end in the spring of 1961, this was not the case. ECAFE had first
prepared a report on the development of the Mekong in 1952, and had done so again in 1957. The
latter report, “Development of Water Resources in the Lower Mekong Basin,” had theorized the
development of 90,000 km2 of irrigation and 13.7 gigawatts generated from five dams.29
Similarly, in 1956 and 1958 the U.S. had dispatched their own survey missions to the
Mekong. The 1958 survey, led by former Allied commander Earle Wheeler, agreed that the
Mekong “could easily rank with Southeast Asia's greatest natural resources” if developed properly.
But Wheeler felt that greater metrics were needed before ground could be broken in the Delta. His
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report proposed a five-year study of the region, at the cost of approximately $9 million.30 By 1961,
a coalition of 12 nations and several UN agencies had pledged for the entire project what General
Wheeler believed was necessary for a five-year U.S. study three years earlier. Joint development
in southeast Asia, even among allies, was off to a poor start.
Throughout the late 1950’s, studies compelled more studies in the Mekong. As president,
Johnson later likened the development of the Mekong to the accomplishments of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA), a New Deal program which brought flood control and electricity to the
impoverished region. David Lilienthal, former director of the TVA and later the Atomic Energy
Commission, was a friend of the vice president and attuned to this way of thinking. In a February
1961 letter to Chester Bowles, Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin
American Affairs, Lilienthal discussed the prospects of international development. He agreed with
Bowles in that “the TVA idea and method represent a great political asset of the United States in
parts of the world other than our own.” But on the subject of development in Mekong, Lilienthal
was skeptical:
For several years technical investigations and surveys have been carried on in the
Mekong basin by many technicians. But I, myself, have seen little evidence that this
technical work has been sparked by a broad concept and one with public appeal, or is
possessed of a sense of urgency and of a necessity that people can see. Without these
factors the chance is not too great that much more will result than reports and surveys…31
Lilienthal believed the key to success in such grand projects of development was a “moral
purpose.”32 In Southeast Asia, he detected little. Especially in Vietnam, if regional leaders and
their populations were not convinced that peace and prosperity were directly linked to cooperative
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development initiatives, intervention by foreign, industrialized powers would convince them of
little. A U.S. insistence on ideology could not replace the lack of their own.
As Lilienthal predicted, all that resulted in the immediacy were more reports and surveys.
In early 1962, the outlook for the project’s feasibility was no better. Newly proposed U.S. research
over a five-year period was put at under $2 million.33 In an effort to encourage the project, Bowles
suggested to Kennedy that the project “at the most might pave the way for increasing political
stability” and would certainly improve the “image and posture” of the U.S. in Vietnam.34 But as
civilian advisors worked to launch these grand development projects, the security situation in
South Vietnam continued to deteriorate. 1961 called for a reevaluation of U.S. policy in the region;
development, at best, would take a back-seat within counterinsurgency. As president, Lyndon
Johnson would look to the development of the Mekong as a grand international gesture, one which
he hoped would challenge the direction the war was otherwise headed in. He found the Mekong
development project stagnated, however, as development was placed on the backburner during the
Kennedy administration.

Counterinsurgency in Action
Kennedy needed something to show for his investment in 1962. As money and military
advisers poured into South Vietnam under the guise of project Beef-Up, new policies were
formulated. Counterinsurgency would shape up to be a strategy of deprivation. The most blatant
example of this was Operation Ranch Hand, which had undergone testing throughout 1961.
Beginning in January of 1962, Ranch Hand missions began flying throughout the country,
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dumping herbicides throughout the countryside in an effort to poison food crops and strip the land
of foliage in which guerrillas sought cover. By 1970, one million pounds of herbicides would be
dropped on more than four million acres of the country the U.S. sought to defend.35 ‘Agent
Orange,’ the most infamous of the herbicides used, rose to notoriety due to its effects on the
Vietnamese people. It is claimed that as many as 3 million Vietnamese suffered illnesses due to
the vast exposure to the herbicide.36
A more complicated policy of counterinsurgency came to be known as the ‘Strategic
Hamlet’ program. The policy, popularized by Roger Hilsman in his February 1962 report entitled
“A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam,” had actually been on the minds of the South Vietnamese
government for nearly a year. Introduced in the spring of 1961 by British counterinsurgency
advisor Robert Thompson, and based on his experiences in Malaya and the Philippines, the goal
of the Strategic Hamlet program would be to separate the VC and NLF from their ultimate prize:
the rural peasant population. This would be achieved by relocating these populations into smaller,
fortified villages, protecting them from the insurgents who looked to recruit or terrorize them.
The program proved enticing to Diem, especially considering its commonalities with his
previous ‘agroville’ scheme. In addition to depriving insurgents of their sustaining resources, the
reorganization of rural peasants was touted as a means of providing them social and economic
revolution. This would be accomplished through the work of Civic Action teams, building
immense trust in the Diem government. Relocation would prove sizable aspect of these plans,
indicating lessons not learned from the failure of the ‘agroville’ attempt.
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In his “Strategic Concept” report, Hilsman provided an answer to this. Only the “[s]uitably
hardy, loyal and tough villagers” were to be relocated – whatever that meant. Just as Kenneth
Young had wrongly assumed years earlier, policy planners again believed that Vietnamese
peasants would be easily enticed to willingly move from at-risk areas with a combination of GVN
might, ideological solidarity, and American funds to sweeten the deal. Respecting the ‘Strategic’
aspect of the Hamlets, these fortified villages would serve the GVN best on the Laotian and
Cambodian borders.37 Regarding Strategic Hamlet fortifications, Hilsman’s report went much
further than Thompson’s recommendations, which called for meager defenses: ‘bamboo shoots
and moats.’ Strategic hamlets reinforced by the U.S. would be protected by a ditch and a fence of
barbed wire, and would include:
[O]ne or more observation towers, guard posts, and a defense post for central storage of
arms. The area immediately around the village will be cleared for fields of fire and the
area approaching the clearing … strewn with booby-traps (spikes, pits, explosives, etc.)
and other personnel obstacles.38
Protected inside the Hamlets, peasants would be able to live unmolested, and thus not challenged
with the prospect of shielding the VC; meanwhile, outside the Hamlets in “free-fire zones,”
insurgents would be flushed into the open.
Hilsman’s report was the culmination of months’ worth of research into counterinsurgency.
Additionally, it inadvertently served to catch up with Diem’s efforts. Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh
Nhu, had been softly implementing early strategic hamlet plans since at least as early as November
of 1961. Only a day after Hilsman circulated his report, the program had officially begun: Diem
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established the Intermenstrual Committee for Strategic Hamlets, with Nhu placed in charge. “A
Strategic Concept for South Vietnam” also proposed operation Sunrise in order to test the Strategic
Hamlet policy, and was undertaken the following month, in March of 1962. According to Michael
Forrestal, then Assistant to the President for Far Eastern Affairs, the claims that the Hamlets would
really serve as concentration camps, in which peasants were forcibly relocated, originated with
this initial Operation under Nhu’s direction. Looking back, Forrestal called the Strategic Hamlet
program “one of the worst mistakes that ha[d] ever been made in Vietnam.” Yet in the moment,
during operation Sunrise, success seemed all but assured. As the Pentagon historian for the
Operation recalls, when ARVN forces arrived to “liberate” peasants of the NLF-held Ben Cat
district, the VC “simply melted into the jungles.”39
What Hilsman, Forrestal, and others of the U.S. mission did not know at the time was that,
though $300,000 worth of funds were appropriated for the purpose of the relocation (which
included expenses to build new homes and public facilities), Nhu chose to withhold the funds until
“loyalty” could be assured amongst the peasants. Even following these assurances, those relocated
under and after operation Sunrise were forced to pay the South Vietnamese government for
reconstruction materials. Early reports also suggested that less than 35% of families relocated
willingly. These figures were largely ignored. As Nhu embezzled American aid, Vietnamese
peasants began to associate U.S. troops with forcible relocation and government harassment.40
Like Diem, Nhu saw controlling the rural population of his country as paramount to
remaining in power. This shared concern, however, was complimented by an open disdain towards
American intervention. Historians have connected the Ngo Dinh family’s disdain with their
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conception of “self-sufficiency,” inherent to their “personalist” doctrine. Yet in a 1958 interview
given to La Vie Française, Nhu provided what could be considered more practical reasons for
frustration in joint projects with Americans. Regarding USOM projects in agriculture, Nhu stated,
[the government of South Vietnam] find that the development of our economy suffers
from American slowness. We should prefer to form a committee of experts from all
nations, in which USOM would have nothing but financial control of the funds
[provided] … Having all responsibility in one single body paralyzes it.41
Though ostensibly speaking on only agricultural affairs four years prior, Nhu laid out in this
interview his concerns of sharing power with U.S. missions. The Strategic hamlets, therefore, were
too precious a form of control to be hindered by ‘American slowness.’ With U.S. funds for the
Hamlets contingent upon ‘success,’ Nhu aimed to work both fast and alone: before Sunrise even
took place, Washington received a report that nearly 800 Hamlets had been erected.42
Regarding security, observation towers and barbed wire no doubt depicted concentration
camps. Hilsman’s report called for “physical security” first and foremost, and dealt not only with
strategic hamlets, but with their protection. Amongst other measures, Hilsman took up the issue of
the ineffective Civil Guard. He was no doubt aware of Lansdale’s assessment of the early forms
of the Civil Guard, which rightly pointed out that it did not effectively engage rural communities.
With severely limited mobility, these units could not assure wide populations of governmentprovided safety; meanwhile, their weak armaments assured little capacity to protect their resident
populations.
Hilsman agreed that while a lack of mobility posed a problem within all GVN forces, the
prospect of leaving rural villages unprotected was of greater concern. His plan recommended
increasing the Civil Guard forces and cutting their training time in half, and in general promoted
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further outreach into rural areas. Hilsman argued that there was utility in this static defense force
which would deny the Viet Cong access to supplies and protection, and place the safety of villagers
at the forefront of GVN operations. Civil Guards responding to subversion would have smaller
distances to travel, and would benefit from a buffer zone provided by “Defended Villages,” which
would line the periphery of Viet Cong controlled territory and defend the hamlets within.43
Counterinsurgency, now delivered in the form of the Strategic Hamlet policy, called for an
increase in all GVN forces. When the ‘Strategic Concept’ report was circulated, Civic Action
teams, composed of 17-18 cadre, numbered 30-40.44 The Director of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research at the State Department believed 200 were necessary, and considered these teams
“the single most important element in eliminating the Viet Cong.” However, though Civic Action
teams were meant to engage the populations in order to aid development, construction, and
ultimately “build the essential socio-political base,” the report also foresaw the need to build up
all GVN forces. Though Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps numbers were already set to rise
during 1962 thanks to Beef-Up, Hilsman found their projected growth unsatisfactory. A projected
Civil Guard increase by 5,000 from its current force of 67,000 was deemed too low: Hilman’s
report called for a total force of 130,000, or a near-doubling. Even more so, the Self Defense Corps,
at its current strength of 56,000, needed to be bolstered to 150,000. In holding strategic hamlets,
force would be first and foremost.45
Hilsman reported in April of 1962 that 150-200 hamlets had been completed, and that
province chiefs were boasting even greater advances in the new year. The descriptions were
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optimistic. With the establishment of new village councils, “gifts of medicine, clothing, and rice,”
and the restraint of officials to not take reprisals against villagers who once supported the VC,
villages had remained free of communist control for months. The undue optimism in such an early
report depicts the secrecy, false reporting, and “rapid execution” with which Nhu implemented the
Hamlets. By September, over 3,200 Hamlets had been constructed, with over 2,200 on the way.
Those completed housed nearly 5 million dislocated peasants, or about 34% of South Vietnam.46
In July of 1962, possibly in coordination with the Kennedy administration, U. Alexis
Johnson published “Internal Defense and the Foreign Service” in the Foreign Service Journal to
outline the balance of civilian and military operations necessary to the success of
counterinsurgency. Having served as U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from 1953-1958, then
to Thailand until 1961, the Deputy Undersecretary of State was considered an experienced civilian
voice on the subject of communist insurgency. In this short piece, he warned, “under present
circumstances the threat [developing] countries face is now not so much invasion from without as
destruction from within.” U.A. Johnson called for a comprehensive response, to achieve a
resistance to subversion “all-inclusive in scope.” Notably, he emphasized the evolving roles and
overall promise of civilian agencies in strengthening vulnerable communities in developing
nations. He framed their potential in a post-Marshall Plan context, arguing that American aid must
not be purely economic but also attuned to “the roots of subversion and insurgency as toward its
overt manifestations.” Counterinsurgency required expert coordination between and a balance of
both civilian and military measures.47
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The Deputy Undersecretary’s proclamation that “it will always be too late if resort must be
had to military measures” seems sensible. However, it was U.A. Johnson who less than a year
prior had advocated that 20,000-25,000 troops be dispatched to the Vietnamese Central Highlands.
Moreover, key counterinsurgency projects such as Operation Ranch Hand and the Strategic
Hamlet program were taking on a heavily militarized nature. Hilsman’s ‘Strategic Concept’ report
called for both military and civilian advisers to successfully implement the strategic hamlets – yet
with a near 10:1 personnel ratio, military advising was sure to outbalance civilian input. Despite
the evident contradictions, “Internal Defense and the Foreign Service” served as a precursor to the
administration's formal counterinsurgency document, which arrived in the form of NSAM no. 182:
“Counterinsurgency Doctrine.”48
NSAM no. 182 emphasized America’s role in local wars of communist subversion as
strictly advisory, serving ultimately to support a nation's rise to stable autonomy. This role would
consist mostly of “assistance,” though this assistance specifically aimed to minimize both “the
likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement” as well as “the risk of escalation from subversive
insurgency.”49 U.S. counterinsurgency policy towards South Vietnam (and theoretically other
countries embroiled in communist insurgency) again struck a delicate middle ground, intending to
prevent the escalation of both sides. Something would have to give. Amidst a backdrop of crisis,
in southeast Asia the Kennedy administration in 1961 had proven uninterested in negotiations.
Though 1962 began with moderate success, the situation would again deteriorate, and by the fall
of that year David Halberstam would label South Vietnam “a crisis seeking recognition.”50
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The counterinsurgency memoranda proved to be a mixed bag. It called for serious civilian
operations under subsection b., ‘Methods of Support.’ Eight initiatives – land reform, civic action,
community development, social projects, education, labor and youth, leader groups, and
diplomatic – easily lent themselves to the guise of development.51 But in an atmosphere
characterized by Ranch Hand, strategic hamlets, and Beef-Up, it’s hard to imagine how these
initiatives would have taken priority. Security came first, and as counterinsurgency policy in
actuality reinforced the need for military operations on the ground. The U.S. military mission came
to articulate its criticisms of the civilian mission and its goals; “hearts and minds” would have to
wait. 1962 saw increased military operations by the ARVN, with a dramatic shift in the role U.S.
advisers played. Regarding U.A. Johnson’s “Internal Defense and the Foreign Service,” by 1962,
it was ‘too late’ for South Vietnam.

Substituting Support with Force
At the outset of 1962, the State Department estimated Viet Cong strength within South
Vietnam at 12,600 regular forces, 13,300 irregular forces, and 100,000 supporters and
sympathizers. With these numbers, it appeared the armed wing of the VC had nearly tripled since
early 1960, collecting some 9,000 forces since late 1961. Despite these gains, GVN forces still
maintained a greater than 2:1 superiority, even more so when discounting VC supporters and
sympathizers. With more American training, GVN forces in total were expected to surpass 450,000
by January 1963.52 Yet project Beef-Up sought to boost not only force numbers, but morale.
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Having struggled throughout 1961, the Kennedy administration determined that the following year
would be decisive, and that increases in personnel and equipment would accomplish this.
To this end, Beef-Up nearly tripled the number of U.S. advisers in South Vietnam by the
end of 1962. It also procured hundreds of armored personnel carriers and military aircrafts. Even
before Beef-Up was announced, in early December of 1961 two U.S. helicopter companies – 400
men and 33 H-21C helicopters – had made their way to the country.53 Two months later, the
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Vietnam was replaced with the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Four-star General Paul Harkins took over from threestar general Lionel G. McGarr54 and quickly established himself as a commander of gumption,
eager to apply all new sources of force at his disposal. Responding to a question on the political
consequences of napalm, Harkins enthusiastically that it “really puts the fear of God into the Viet
Cong … and that is what counts.” Likewise, Hilsman professed enthusiasm over the new shows
of force in South Vietnam. With their “fantastic mobility,” helicopters “[r]oaring in over the
treetops … were a terrifying sight to the superstitious Viet Cong peasants.” These statements,
coupled with an increase in more daring search-and-destroy missions, contributed to the idea of
“early 1962.” In early 1962, American shock and awe caused greater VC retreats. Washington
construed interpreted these retreats as clear GVN victories. “Early 1962” falsely convinced U.S.
policymakers that military proliferation could make up for political shortcomings.55
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With Harkins at his side, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara visited the country to assess
the progress of operation Sunrise in the spring of 1962, the kickoff to the strategic hamlet program.
Halberstam remembered that, throughout the trip, as well as during many other visits, McNamara
served as the optimistic, innovative face of U.S. policy in the country. As a civilian leading the
Department of Defense, McNamara was poised to offer insight into the whole of
counterinsurgency. Visiting the results of Sunrise, his questions about the Operation served to
catalog the process: “How much of this? How much of that? Were they happy here?” Known for
thinking in statistics and quantifying ideas, McNamara’s third question was striking. It’s hard to
determine whether he cared that much about, as Ed Lansdale would later put it, how the people
felt. Halberstam took a cynical tone:
[McNamara] epitomized booming American technological success, he scurried around
Vietnam, looking for what he wanted to see; and he never saw nor smelled nor felt what
was really there, right in front of him … the McNamara trips became part of a vast
unwitting and elaborate charade, the institutionalizing and legitimizing of a hopeless lie.
So much “a slave of his own background,” Halberstam believed McNamara was predisposed to
never fully grasp the political realities of the countryside during his visits.56 His constant
accompaniment by Harkins only assured the perpetuation of this “charade.” Once called “an
unmitigated disaster” and “totally insensitive to all the political considerations [of the
countryside],”57 an aide to later-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. made clear that civilian
officials who worked within the country feared the appointment of Harkins. To them, he signified
the prevailing mentality of force that U.S. policy was bending to, which was no substitute for the
inherently-political struggle for Vietnam.
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In early 1962, correspondent Bernard Fall perceived a new strategy of counterinsurgency
being employed by the U.S. in South Vietnam. Whereas traditionally in revolutionary wars
“popular support” was considered paramount in defeating insurgents, U.S. policy now intended to
substitute this with technological innovations and tactical prowess. To further his point, he cited
two major civilian policy planners who had long concerned themselves with the issue of “popular
support,” albeit superficially.58 During his June 1961 speech at Fort Bragg, Rostow had not only
touted his “take-off” theory and the need for programs of “development, communications, and
indoctrination,” but simultaneously cast serious doubt on how vital local support was in sustaining
guerrilla movements:
… I am sometimes lectured that this or that government within the free world is not
popular; they tell me that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are
dissatisfied. These are, at best, half-truths.59
Similarly, in a preface to the 1962 English edition of South Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap’s
People’s War, People’s Army, Hilsman claimed that “[g]uerrillas do not need majority support
from the entire countryside. They can operate effectively even if some of the populace is hostile
and the rest indifferent.”60 Considering the distinction of policy approaches, as well as testimony
from both missions, it is apparent that 1962 was a year of technological and tactical innovations.
Any importance placed on “popular support,” essentially the political struggle, was sure to fall to
the wayside.
The introduction of helicopters was intended to give GVN forces what Halberstam called
a “booster shot,” as well as increase the effectiveness of search-and-destroy missions. An excellent
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example of both technological and tactical innovation, helicopters would enable the ARVN and
Civil Guards to conduct high-power attacks on VC forces with theoretically less advance planning,
fewer casualties, and an overwhelming superiority. Still, Halberstam observed that by the summer
of 1962, the introduction of helicopters “had not altered the nature of the war or the enemy’s
techniques.” Instead, the VC were simply “caught off guard” and, according to officials like
Harkins and Hilsman, prone to retreat quicker than they had the previous year.61
Helicopters may have played an even smaller role than policymakers wanted to believe.
The Pentagon Papers history reports that the first U.S. helicopter downed by enemy forces
occurred in early February of 1962, less than two months after their arrival.62 Additionally, like
any technology introduced to the Vietnamese countryside, helicopters were bound to become
commonplace. VC forces proved adaptive not only learning to down these helicopters over time
but retreat at their arrival, as helicopters came to indicate the coming of ground forces protected
by armed personnel carriers. The sound of the helicopters in many cases aided the VC in preserving
their forces.
Surely, the VC spent the first half of 1962 adjusting to the new firepower with which GVN
forces commanded. As the year continued, the VC largely abandoned battalion-sized. Naturally,
U.S. advisers and policymakers interpreted this optimistically. In reality, the VC were shifting
their own tactics, carrying out attacks against outposts and villages. During the second half of
1962, they staged nearly two ambushes per day, most of which occurred in the Mekong Delta
region and outside Saigon.63 Despite this shying away from taking on large groups of GVN forces,
the VC were still somehow emboldened during this period of expanded American commitment.
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For example, while conducting a sweep of the Mekong Delta in early October, an ARVN Division
came in contact with a VC Battalion. As Halberstam put it, the VC Battalion changed their tactics:
“they stood and fought instead of fleeing, and decimated the Ranger company.”64
It is not perplexing to determine how the VC could have felt emboldened against such a
backdrop of increased U.S. aid and presence. In early 1962, military commanders, including
Harkins, circulated a series of papers entitled “Lessons Learned.” Within these documents, it was
discovered that U.S.-supported operations in the countryside were generally failing. Of thirteen
operations from March through June, only two were deemed “successful.” The rest ranged between
finding no VC, to encountering small VC forces and causing only token casualties. Furthermore,
despite the manpower and equipment that Beef-Up supposedly furnished, GVN forces were failing
to pursue the enemy. Around this time also arose the phenomenon of fake body counts, in which
GVN forces would conduct search-and-destroy raids, fail to pursue the enemy or survey battlefield
casualties, and concoct an unverifiable number of VC wounded and killed to report to their
superiors.65
The VC may have directly benefitted from the newly-furnished GVN forces. During 1961,
morale became a concern for good reason: when GVN forces retreated, they left behind weapons
of a quality which the VC otherwise did not have access to. In the first six months of 1962, GVN
forces lost 2,588 weapons to the VC. In comparison to the loss rate of 1961, this was an
improvement; moreover, GVN forces collected nearly as many weapons from the VC as they
surrendered during that period. Still, GVN weapons provided by U.S. aid were more
technologically advanced, ultimately leveling the conflict as the VC upgraded their armaments.
Weapons surrendered also allowed the VC to prioritize more important commodities (such as
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heavy artillery and much-needed medications) that were shipped in costly supply convoys from
North Vietnam.66
As the VC changed their strategy to attack outposts and villages more often than GVN
forces, they encountered the effects of the Strategic Hamlet program. During operation Sunrise,
205 families had been relocated, the majority of them forcibly. Upon their reestablishment, it was
found that 120 males of arms-bearing age resided in the new community. Forcible relocation not
only aided VC recruitment, but rendered communities already emotionally decimated unable to
defend themselves in the face of insurgency.67 In Fire in the Lake, Frances Fitzgerald argued that
this factor compounded aspects of the new Hamlets which were indisputably un-strategic. The
program planners had assumed that spread out villages in the countryside were naturally
unorganized and therefore required consolidation to introduce order. This assumption, which
Fitzgerald contended was far from the truth, trapped peasants relocated in strategic hamlets.
Concentrated in a small area, walled in with barbed wire and spikes, peasant populations were
never easier to encircle and infiltrate. As the GVN forces over-reported VC kills to tout progress
in the conflict, so too did Nhu when measuring their Strategic Hamlet success. In hastily relocating
Vietnamese throughout the countryside, Diem’s government cut many important corners; namely,
security. An American survey at the end of 1962 found that less than 10% of the ‘completed’
strategic hamlets possessed any military defense at all.68
In as early as June of 1962, all of these factors were coming together to spell out defeat for
GVN forces. Writing for the New York Times, Homer Bigart reported on the VC using an “old
ruse” to deal an effective defeat to GVN forces. The incident culminated in a raid on a district
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government headquarters in the Delta, in which guerrilla forces, having burned government
buildings and kidnapped several officials, killed fifteen Civil Guards and three civilians. The ‘ruse’
began with a diversionary force: 100 VC attacked an outpost four miles outside of town. Reacting
as expected, the district chief dispatched the Civil Guards, at which point “the Communists struck
against the weakened defenses and overran the town. They cut all roads and blocked canals by
sinking barges in them.” An air attack by GVN forces was quickly ordered, though it is unclear if
they actually pursued the enemy as it retreated. Helicopters were also called in, but arrived too
late. In their escape, the VC had made off with “considerable plunder” – over 30 firearms of
varying capabilities, and several radios.69
Strategic hamlets were bound to be poorly defended, if at all. While Harkins and Hilsman
agreed on many concerns regarding GVN force, an area in which they disagreed was the most
effective form of defense. Harkins, like the generals before and after him, was relatively
unconcerned with counterinsurgency priorities. In his mind, clearing and holding territory meant
nothing if the enemy retreated further and further each time. Furthermore, those who advocated
for search-and-destroy missions in 1962 were well-received. Considering the chaos of 1961 and
the persisting unwillingness by GVN forces to truly take the fight to the enemy, Washington
deferred to mobile operations in an effort to turn the tide of the conflict. Looking back on the
strategic hamlet program, Harkins recalled that the program “didn’t really start” until some point
in 1963.70 This seems odd, as Nhu routinely publicized his ambition to create over 6,000 strategic
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hamlets in 1962 alone.71 And though many were inclined to distrust Nhu, and with good reason,
Harkins is continuously depicted as one who followed the line of the Diem family.
It may be that U.S. military advisers simply didn’t care about the civilian approach to
counterinsurgency. U.S. military personnel admitted that strategic hamlets served a purpose in
controlling the civilian population of South Vietnam. But they argued, as they had during the
Eisenhower administration, that the litany of GVN paramilitary forces used to defend the hamlets
were unnecessary. In order to defeat an insurgent enemy supported by a neighboring country,
military advisors rationalized, what was needed was not stationary paramilitary forces but a hardhitting, conventional army. That strong army in turn would ensure a strong state. Harkins felt this
way, as did lower brass personnel. In response to an April memo discussing the implementation
of Hilsman's “Strategic Concept,” Col. John Stockton wrote Hilsman on the subject of GVN
paramilitary forces:
… we are sort of splitting hairs when we differentiate among Civil Guard, Self Defense,
and run-of-the-mine regular army units. They are all used in more or less static defense
situations, with limited patrolling around their base positions admittedly, but they are not
the highly mobile, anywhere – anytime – any mission type of unit which we picture as
being the so-called Queen of the Battle in our own Army. I think, if the task were up to
me, I would somehow lump these three groups together … 72
Stockton's response summarizes the views of the military mission. Many U.S. military advisors
thought paramilitary forces would best serve the GVN as offensive and indistinguishable from the
ARVN. MAAG furnished the Civil Guard with slightly advanced weaponry, though also with the
mentality of fighting an open conflict. Later, under MACV, early reports of combined Civil Guard
and ARVN units successfully repelling VC attacks spurred optimism about military control of the
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forces.73 Under civilian directorship, the Civil Guards were determined ineffective; under military
leadership, their defensive orientation was abandoned. By 1964, the Civil Guard had been
officially integrated into the ARVN.
Despite this desire for control, in which military training and arming came at the expense
of civilian influence, some military personnel held more practical reasons for discounting civilian
counterinsurgency operations. Col. John Paul Vann, on the ground in the Delta during 1962, held
great respect for Ed Lansdale and his ‘common man’ theory. Vann supported the aid projects which
the U.S. implemented alongside his guerrilla war – he simply felt he could get his job done faster.
As Sheehan wrote,
Vann thought that it would probably require ten years to create a healthy rural society of
satisfied peasants … impervious to Communist attempts to renew the insurgency. It
should not take him more than six months to smash the Main Force and Regional
guerrillas in the northern Delta and start this cycle of returning peace…74
Still, counterinsurgency programs like the strategic hamlets appeared to obstruct military
operations. In late October of 1962, Vann learned that Colonel Cao (who he had been advising in
the region) had ordered his troops not to pursue VC Battalions following skirmishes. When Vann
complained against Cao, Diem reassured Cao that the Vietnamese colonel had made the right
decision. In fact, Diem chided, “[Cao] was taking far too many casualties … He would have to be
more careful; he was listening too much to his American advisers. … [I]f he wanted a promotion,
he would have to be more prudent.”75 With the airpower and artillery that Beef-Up had introduced
to GVN forces that year, Diem felt that the use of infantry was inefficient. Most importantly, Diem
in late 1962 was convinced he was winning Vietnamese peasants over, for he was skillfully
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separating them from the VC and NLF with his Strategic Hamlet program. With this grand
separation, “the sea of guerrilla fish” (a metaphor first employed by Mao) was drying up, and
“there was no need to seek out infantry battles.”76
In the fall of 1962, a State Department study looked ahead at the prospects in South
Vietnam. Optimism from Diem’s government and many U.S. officials was “premature.” “At best,”
the study began, “it appears that the rate of deterioration has decelerated.”77 Warning signs that the
VC were not defeated but adapting were becoming clearer, as were Nhu’s seriously inflated
strategic hamlet statistics. Civilian personnel found this concerning; military personnel less so.

Not to Be Liked, But to Be Tough
At the beginning of 1963, the U.S. continued to maintain a significant military advisory
presence in South Vietnam – about 11,000 personnel. Sheehan writes that American officers at the
time often expressed their views on the seemingly stalemated conflict:
[American officers] hoped that the guerrillas would one day be foolish enough to
abandon their skulking ways and fight fairly in a stand-up battle … No American officer,
Vann included, expected to see it fulfilled … Vann could not help but hope that the
guerrillas would someday display such foolhardy temerity. It seemed to be the only way
he would ever succeed in annihilating a whole battalion.78
Of course, as Halberstam pointed out, as early as October of 1962, the VC were already fighting
the occasional “stand-up battle.” When they did, they fared well. In the Mekong Delta especially,
that both Halberstam and Sheehan (shadowing Vann) covered, the situation was actually dire.
When the VC weren’t making open stands, they were increasing their influence in the region, and
continuing to terrorize the peasant populace and run sabotage missions amongst the peasant
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populace. Roads in the Delta were too dangerous to travel at night. If braved during the day, ditches
had been dug and bridges destroyed to foil convoys that dared. The VC mobilized peasants in
provinces where GVN forces refused to patrol. In May of 1962, according to Sheehan, Vann felt
the need to “reverse the trend of war” in the Delta, as the VC “had the strategic and tactical
initiative.” In October of 1962, Halberstam proclaimed “the beginning of the end” in the Delta.79
The Battle of Ap Bac, fought on January 2, 1963, proved to be a turning point in the VC’s
battle against GVN forces. About 350 guerrillas took on 2,000 ARVN soldiers, aided by U.S.
personnel and equipment. The battle resulted in comparatively heavy casualties (61 dead,
including 3 Americans, and over 100 wounded) and five downed helicopters. Sheehan attributed
much of this victory to the training the VC underwent following previous GVN skirmishes. Ap
Bac proved the VC had perfected the takedown of helicopters, as well as learned to anticipate and
even use U.S. heavy artillery, which was often left behind in battle during the previous two years.80
As villages came under NLF control, VC soldiers regularly hid amongst civilians.
Napalming and the indiscriminate gunning down of civilians during 1963 increasingly turned the
peasant population against the government. As Hilsman and Forrestal reported to Kennedy early
in the year, it was impossible to determine just how many of the 20,000 VC killed in 1962 were
actually guerrillas, and not civilians.81 Meanwhile air strikes in 1963 already numbered 1,000 per
month.
Their report to Kennedy also called attention to military personnel who had voiced
concerns over the defense of strategic hamlets. As internal hamlet security had yet to improve,
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Hilsman and Forrestal recommended better communication and the prospect of air support for
hamlets under siege.82 Rather than using the lessons of 1962 to reconsider tactics in 1963, the U.S.
advisers continued to resort to indiscriminate firepower against the guerrillas, resulting in ever
higher civilian casualties.
Historian George Herring aptly describes that spring as a time when “optimism and
uncertainty coexisted uneasily.”83 MACV held the line on the ground that, despite increasingly
pessimistic news reports, GVN forces were securing victories. Testing the boundaries of reality,
General Harkins proclaimed “a Vietnamese victory. It certainly was.” At a press conference
following the battle, Harkins not only varnished over the defeat, but also added that, at the time,
GVN soldiers were still in hot pursuit of the VC and requesting artillery and airstrikes. In reality,
the exact opposite was true.84
This is not to say there were no dissenting views within the military mission. John Paul
Vann was the primary naysayer. Vann kept reporters close during operations, reported to them
immediately afterwards, and provided documents he felt pertinent to understanding the situation
from his perspective. But even higher-ranking officers such as Admiral Harry D. Felt began to
doubt the war was going well in 1963. Following an April conference in Honolulu, in which
Harkins stated that the conflict could come to a close by Christmas of 1965, Felt expressed doubts
that such an early removal of troops was likely. Though Felt held the MACV line in public, he and
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other advisers likely assessed the continuous build-up under Beef-Up against the continuous
failings of GVN forces, and concluded that such optimism was not warranted.85
Disregard for the GVN losses and tactical failures was not limited to the military mission.
Hilsman, when confronted by a reporter during his trip to Saigon with Forrestal in January,
disputed a claim that the government was failing in its pacification missions, and that Nhu was not
the proper official to implement that program. He replied that “the important thing was not to be
liked, but to be tough and get things done.” This dubious notion came from the very man who had
a year prior emphasized the importance of socioeconomic progress in peasant villages and building
political support for the national government.86
Meanwhile, others officials had growing concerns. The political situation in South
Vietnam, though largely ignored by many on the ground in the country, was clearly deteriorating.
Prominent members of the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) lobbying group, especially
senator Mike Mansfield, were losing faith in Diem. When Diem in April requested the removal of
2,000 military advisers due to issues of “sovereignty,” Ambassador Frederick Nolting instead
suggested withholding funds from the country. Nolting realized that the Vietnamese president
simply wanted more control over the aid distributed to rural hamlets. In May, the South
Vietnamese government aroused greater American dissatisfaction when, on the Buddha’s 2,527th
birthday, Diem banned the flying of any flag other than the nation’s. In defiance, Buddhists flew
their flags in defiance, and in Hue GVN security forces opened fire on a celebratory crowd, killing
nine civilians. Two days later, reacting to thousands of Buddhists protesting the nine deaths, Diem
jailed prominent monks and their supporters, declaring them a Communist front organization. The
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monks had alerted the foreign press to send photographers to the scene. One particularly disturbing
image became a national rallying cry against the Diem government, and alerted the international
community of the chaos engulfing the American-backed government in South Vietnam.87 No other
news from Vietnam did more to provoke anti-war sentiment in the United States. What condition,
many wondered, could drive the opposition to such an extreme measure?
During that summer, U.S. support for Diem became ever more precarious. Diem’s position
on GVN operations – that they should not unnecessarily “sacrifice” units in pursuit of VC – was
much to blame for failed offensives such as Ap Bac. MACV struggled to find a way to make the
Saigon government more aggressive. As Washington policymakers began to debate serious
pressure or a change in government, military advisers privately struggled to support the South
Vietnamese president. Fearing that alienating Diem would dash all chances of success in the
country, Harkins and other advisers pushed the increasingly incredible MACV line of optimism in
the face of military defeats. At the beginning of the 1963, the JCS and military advisers had learned
from the Wheeler Mission that the situation was dire. VC forces were now coordinating
significantly with North Vietnamese units that were infiltrating the South along the Ho Chi Minh
Trail through Laos and Cambodia. In July, Ho Chi Minh visited Beijing, where Chinese
Communists promised him vast material support including 90,000 rifles. As the year progressed,
many military advisers and the JCS sought to widen the war to combat these obstacles and strike
decisive victories. Sanctions and retaliatory measures (like bombings) against the North were
common proposals. Meanwhile, Harkins looked ahead to 1964. Realizing that military assistance
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was set to decrease from $187 million to $130 million as Beef-Up phased out, he instead proposed
an increase to $234 million.88
Richard Betts and Leslie Gelb in The Irony of Vietnam described this uncertainty as the
damned if you do, damned if you don’t dilemma. Though Betts and Gelb largely attribute this
dilemma to Washington policymakers concerned with Diem and South Vietnam’s chances for
political stability, it applies to the military mission as well. Despite Diem’s sporadic concerns with
“sovereignty,” he had allowed U.S. military personnel to advise and fight alongside GVN forces,
while consistently pressing to increase his own forces. To lose Diem would mean a new
government in Saigon, one which could prove even more ineffective and resistant to American
assistance. Additionally, members of the GI generation (including Harkins, but going as far back
as Williams and Dulles) still believed that a powerful state could only be ushered in with a
powerful military. Diem had always wanted such an approach, and for that he was a leader worth
keeping. Still, Diem’s growing inaction, his reliance on Nhu’s oppressive intelligence network,
and their counterinsurgency projects all undermined American initiatives. To lose Diem was risky;
keeping him involved possibly even more risks.89
Many Washington policymakers shared this growing disenchantment. Congressmen,
including some members of the AFV, questioned American support of the Diem government, and
some even openly entertained the idea of a coup. As Averell Harriman’s influence over Vietnam
policy grew throughout 1963 (serving first as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern affairs from
January 1961-April 1963, then as Under Secretary of State for political affairs from May 1963March 1965), Ambassador Nolting detected a shift in the Department’s attitude towards Diem.
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During his tenure as Ambassador, Nolting had worked loyally to implement Kennedy’s
instructions in South Vietnam. He publically sought to influence the Diem government not by
threats but by praise. Privately, Nolting criticized the “sensational reporting” coming from within
the country. He meant to maintain Diem’s confidence, as well as save face at home, and took
actions like drafting a white paper on “the role of the press” in the country. As the fall approached,
Nolting found that the line he’d long held was becoming untenable. As policymakers lost patience
with Diem, the priorities of those in the field such as Nolting and Harkins were became those of
the old guard.90
The change was apparent by late August, when Republican senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
replaced Nolting as U.S. ambassador. Less than a month into his appointment, Kennedy tasked
Lodge with with seriously pressing Diem for reforms. The White House, following an earlier NSC
meeting, had drafted 13 proposals for Lodge to present. They included the release of political
prisoners, civil treatment of Buddhists and students, press liberalization, confining secret police
operations to combatting VC activities, free elections, and the right to assembly. Lodge was given
great latitude to push these reforms. As the cablegram laid out, the new Ambassador was
specifically authorized “to apply any controls you think helpful for this purpose … to delay any
delivery of supplies or transfer of funds by any agency until you are satisfied that delivery is in
U.S. interest.” Lodge could also add or subtract from the list of reforms as he wished, keeping in
mind that it was not U.S. policy to terminate discontinue aid to South Vietnam.91
Nonetheless, the transition was complete. With Lodge’s appointment, the U.S. abandoned
the stance of accommodating Diem, in favor of pressure and the potential for rescinding assistance.
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As the White House made clear to Lodge, the “need to set a psychological tone and image [was]
paramount.”92 The new ambassador was the right man to fulfill this task. A “shrewd, tough
operator,” Halebrstam considered him “very much a match for the Ngo family.” He remarked that
Lodge quickly came to consider the ruling family inept, and that he listened to and in turn was
respected by reporters and U.S. civilian mission personnel.93
Yet only two days after receiving his instructions for reform, Lodge pessimistically replied
to the White House: “Frankly, I see no opportunity at all for substantive changes.” The new
ambassador couldn’t conceive of aid sanctions that wouldn’t slow the war effort or cause economic
collapse. Going forward, he planned to “let [Diem] sweat for awhile” while he waited for the
Saigon government to approach him on the subject of reforms and sanctions. However, Lodge did
suggest that perhaps the U.S. mission could find “some part of the [US]AID program to hold up,”
which would prompt Diem to respond and perhaps initiate some reforms.94 This suggestion
revealed the new style Lodge brought to his position, rightly dubbed “a crafty Yankee” by
Sheehan.95 Lodge had been in South Vietnam long enough to understand not only military
operations, but civilian as well. He’d spoken to William Flippen and Rufus Phillips, key USAID
officials, who’d delivered gloomy reports on the war effort, control of the Mekong Delta, and
especially the strategic hamlet program.
Meanwhile, Lodge understood the Ngo Dinhs. Civilian projects like the strategic hamlets
were close to Diem’s heart for purposes of national prestige and feigned unity, closer still to Nhu’s
for purposes of expanding his intelligence network, which oppressed rural populations without
engendering either loyalty or control. The strategic hamlets, civic action, and other USAID
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programs, if necessary, might serve as excellent leverage if they went on the chopping block.
During 1963, the number of strategic hamlets in the country had grown. Though Nhu had fallen
behind his personal goal set the previous year, he and Diem reported that by the summer of 1963,
the program sheltered two-thirds of the country’s population. The rate of construction vastly
outpaced what U.S. personnel thought workable, a view held mostly by civilian officials,
particularly those of USAID.96
Halberstam reported a September 6 NSC meeting in which Major General Victor Krulak
and Rufus Phillips, USAID coordinator for the strategic hamlet program, went toe-to-toe over the
American “successes” in Vietnam. Though Krulak and Phillips were only two of many briefing
the president that day, they represented the conflicting views over the future of the missions in
Vietnam. Known for faithfully restating the optimistic line taken by MACV commander Paul
Harkins, Krulak reported the shooting war was achieving its goals. He expressed only minor
concern over the Nhus but insisted that, “Diem was good. Our man. Respectable.”97
Phillips, though not alone in dissent that day, was especially primed to poke holes in the
MACV line on the war. Though civilian in its conception, the strategic hamlet program had always
pursued military objectives. ARVN forces, advised by U.S. military personnel, were charged with
relocating populations into new hamlets. Once there, Civil Guards and Self Defense Corps
provided security, a process known as clear-and-hold. Civilian assistance, in the forms of civic
action, USAID personnel, and American dollars, lagged behind these military priorities, since the
mindset which had long governed U.S. counterinsurgency, security first, remained paramount.
Under Beef-Up, search-and-destroy missions replaced the static defensive mindset of clear-and!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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hold operations. Though this may have meant more VC killed, it slowly depleted hamlets of their
defense forces. Already hastily built by Nhu, completed hamlets in 1962-1963 became easy targets
for NLF and VC infiltrators. When defenses forces were present, they often performed poorly.
And since those defenders were now trained primarily by the U.S. military mission, the blame
could no longer fall on civilian personnel such as the Michigan State University Group (MSUG).98
By the fall of 1963, the U.S. military deserved significant blame for the failures of the strategic
hamlet program.
Halberstam lauded Phillips’ testimony that day as being “the first frontal attack upon the
military reporting … a remarkable moment in the American bureaucracy, a moment of intellectual
honesty.” Phillips agreed with those at the September 6 NSC meeting who believed a change in
the Saigon government was needed. Many leading Vietnamese shared that view. He also called
into question the military’s focus of reporting, as he and other civilian officers firmly believed
Vietnam to be a political, not military, war, even though militarily, Phillips held, it was being lost.
U.S. soldiers were unreliable in assessing the political situation as they were ordered not to discuss
politics with the forces they advised. Essentially, Phillips contended that MACV itself wasn’t
suited to report on the entirety of the insurgency in South Vietnam. While MACV relied largely
on the successes achieved near Saigon, the Mekong Delta region in August alone had lost nearly
fifty hamlets to VC forces. As another example, Phillips had discovered a report by civilian officer
Earl Young from the province of Long An in which he stated that VC forces controlled 80% of the
province. What was worrying was not only such a glaring statistic, but that Young claimed a
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military report echoed these findings. Prepared by Young’s military counterpart in the province,
MACV had yet to acknowledge its existence.99
The NSC meeting showcased the divide over U.S. missions and future prospects in South
Vietnam. Jumping to Phillips’ defense, Averell Harriman, then-Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, called Krulak a “damn fool.” Krulak’s takeaway was anything but open-minded:
the major who had authored the Long An report contradicting MACV received a bad efficiency
report and transferred to a meaningless National Guard post. Had Lodge not defended the Phillips
and Young, MACV would have charged the two with security violations.100
Halberstam reported that Phillips’ testimony carried the day. Yet by late 1963, Phillips’
cause was a dying one. Calling attention to the failures of the strategic hamlet program had little
impact. Meanwhile, the U.S. military effort in Vietnam had long faltered under the pattern outlined
by Betts and Gelb. Citing the French Indochina War a decade prior, the two asserted that though
French and Saigon forces continued to improve, they “never got good enough.” The Viet Minh
and North Vietnamese handily defended them time after time, and the French struggled on only
with increased amounts of U.S. aid. As one cynical French official remarked, “The U.S. pays the
bulls, we supply the blood.”101
The U.S. now found itself in a similar conflict. Adopting a war of attrition required aid
with no notion of how much would be enough to break the back of the insurgency. According to
Betts and Gelb, a lack of political cohesion was sure to exacerbate these needs, while ultimately
predetermining a U.S. much as the French experienced. Under Beef-Up, the U.S. sought to extend
more power and more control to GVN forces. Both initiatives failed, as losses mounted. As Diem
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dithered, the NLF retained the strategic initiative. Diem’s claim of achieving political cohesion
was a fantasy: strategic hamlets uprooted peasants, endangered them, and aided VC terror and
recruitment. By the fall of 1963, U.S. policy in South Vietnam resembled an “empty shell.”102 A
lack of political cohesion and popular support persisted despite increases in military resources.

Little Dienbienphus
The September 6 NSC meeting which culminated in the Phillips-Krulak showdown left
Kennedy at sea. Following the meeting, he dispatched McNamara and Taylor to compile yet
another joint report on the situation in South Vietnam. A month later, they delivered their findings
to the president. First and foremost, the report stated that “[t]he military campaign has made great
progress and continues to progress.” Despite the report’s boast of graduated withdrawal – that the
military advisory effort would be complete by 1965, and that 1,000 advisers would return home
within two months for Christmas – it advised that further hamlet construction must be contingent
upon raising even greater numbers of GVN forces. The conflict was not drawing to a close, though
Taylor and McNamara believed America’s participation in it was. Strategic hamlets had sown little
in the way of political cohesion; even as their effectiveness depended ever more on a powerful
military. Security would have to come first, especially in the Mekong Delta region. Meanwhile,
building popular support would take a backseat to military operations.103
The report proposed suspending USAID loans aimed at financing large-scale waterworks
and electric power projects in the country to “impress upon Diem our disapproval of his political
program.” Drawing from Nolting’s idle and Lodge’s actual threats, civilian development became
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the U.S. mission’s prime leverage. The report also recommended more civic action programs
within the growing strategic hamlets. This recommendation suggested that Washington
policymakers still did not understand the full extent of Diem and Nhu’s ineffective operations in
the countryside. Civic action throughout the Kennedy years had remained a buzzword. What in
theory sounded promising, that indigenous community workers would build solidarity between
dislocated peasants and their government, proved fatuous in practice. Civic action workers
extracted bribes, withheld U.S. aid, assisted Nhu’s oppressive intelligence apparatus, and
contributed little to the development of the new hamlet communities. Their presence was
unwelcomed and toxic.104
The Taylor-McNamara report ignored Phillips’ concerns over the U.S. military’s
unsubstantiated reports of success. Instead, Taylor and McNamara’s essentially confirmed
Harkins’ VC strength estimate from the month prior, that irregular forces amounted to nearly
100,000 and hard core forces to near 20,000. The joint report indicated a “generally favorable
military picture,” despite confirming that during the spring and summer of 1963 the VC had
managed to grow. An indicators chart from the report also proved less favorable. GVN forces
continued to lose weapons in increasing numbers, surrendering 720 in August alone. At the rates
found in the report, GVN forces in the second half of 1963 were well on their way to losing more
than double those lost in the first half of 1962. Besides GVN material losses, the chart indicated
that the VC maintained strategic superiority. VC forces overwhelmingly initiated operations small
and large while their overall attacks continued unabated at the time of the report’s compilation.105
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The situation in Vietnam had deteriorated to such an extent by November of 1963 that the
Kennedy administration authorized a coup. Much to its surprise the conspirators killed Diem and
his brother Nhu on November 2. That same month, USAID acknowledged that Nhu had severely
inflated the completed strategic hamlet numbers. Supposedly, that month 8,544 hamlets were
completed, with 1,051 under construction. If true, these numbers represented more than half of the
entire project completed; still, somehow, Nhu boasted that 85% of the targeted population were in
these new hamlets. Yet in April of 1964, USAID revised those numbers downward: 6,562 hamlets
completed, 782 under construction, and only 55% of the targeted population in completed
hamlets.106
That spring would also see the departure of Roger Hilsman from the State Department. In
his resignation letter, Hilsman lamented,
In the past, the GVN sought to blanket the whole country with so-called strategic hamlets
which in many cases involved nothing more than wire-enclosed villages doused with
political propaganda, with the Viet Cong agents left in place. The result was to blanket
the Delta with little Dienbienphus—indefensible, inadequately armed hamlets far from
reinforcements, that lacked both governmental benefits and police facilities to winkle out
Communist sympathizers, with Viet Cong pockets left behind. In effect these were
storage places of arms for the Viet Cong which could be seized at any time.
In this grand realization, the American architect of the strategic hamlets decried the failure of the
“oil blot” strategy of U.S. counterinsurgency. He placed that failure on the search-and-destroy
operations. Counterinsurgency developed in the “A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam” report
recommended an “oil blot” strategy, in which hamlets would extend to cover the whole of the
countryside, thus depriving insurgents of territory, resources, and populations. This became the
basis for clear-and-hold. Unfortunately, search-and-destroy operations looked similar, as they
continuously extended outwards, working to deprive the VC if safe havens.. Yet the U.S. military
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constantly argued that static, immobile defense forces were useless, that all should be integrated
under the ARVN, and that search-and-destroy missions would win the war. As their arguments
became policy, the “oil blot” established under the hamlets dissolved. Clear-and-hold operations
were abbreviated to simply clearing.107
The strategic hamlet program set both missions back in their priorities. Within the U.S.
military mission, the strategic hamlets never had priority. At the end of 1962, Taylor had surveyed
the progress of the program and discussed it with Nhu. In a report (drafted by Krulak), Taylor
rather neutrally reported that he saw “no reason for modifying … the long-term virtues of the
program.” A year after its implementation, the program was now “beginning to mature.” But of
the 3,353 hamlets (a number concocted by Nhu) completed at the time of his report, Taylor
believed “probably no more than 600 can be viewed as fulfilling the desired characteristics in terms
of equipment, defensive works, security forces and, possibly most important, government.”108 It
appears Taylor questioned neither the absence of these factors nor their importance. The military
mission had long been aware of the hasty construction and lack of security that had dogged Nhu’s
implementation. Upper level officials like Taylor and Krulak knew they were inefficient, but
simply didn’t care. Winning “hearts and minds” was never an operating principle of U.S. military
policy in South Vietnam. As search-and-destroy operations increased, and advisers and equipment
flowed in, they became further distanced from the peasants Americans claimed to defend.
Lyndon Baines Johnson’s ascension to the presidency after Kennedy’s assassination on
November 22, 1963, seemed to offer an opportunity to reset American policy. After only two days
advisors closest to the war in Vietnam began to get a taste of the “Johnson tone.” That tone pointed
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to an even greater emphasis on the militarization of the war. Unlike Kennedy, who always saw a
need for civilian reforms, Johnson was skeptical at best. Tired of the inter-agency bickering on the
ground, Johnson was predisposed to try to solve the problem of South Vietnam with force. But
Johnson was also a New Dealer. He looked up to FDR, and considered ways to apply New Deal
ideas internationally. To extend the “American peace” Johnson conceived of, and to establish a
new international order, the third world needed economic development to become industrialized
nations. Countries like South Vietnam could benefit from the aid which Europe received from the
U.S. under the Marshall Plan following World War II. Cooperative strategies that transcended
Cold War boundaries could ultimately usher in this “American peace.” With these high ideas in
mind, it becomes all the more perplexing that Johnson, little more than a year later, would begin
to “Americanize” the war. After securing the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August 1964 and
winning the election in November he unleashed the American military. He ordered North Vietnam
bombed on a weekly basis and sent hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to fight in South
Vietnamese jungles, all the while abandoning any efforts to improve life for the Vietnamese
people. The United States would never win “hearts and minds” in Vietnam and would soon enough
lose many of them at home.
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Chapter Three: The Man, the Mekong, and the Military
Writing to a Maryknoll Mission colleague in the late 1950’s, Reverend Albert J. Nevins
spoke of Ngo Dinh Diem fondly:
Perhaps the greatest respect for Ngo can be found in the Communist controlled North. It
is said there that Vietnam has only two real leaders. One is Ho Chi Minh, and the other is
Ngo Dinh Diem, and there is no room for both of them in the country at the same time.1
The quote evokes a perception that propelled Diem to power in the decade prior to his
assassination. In the mid-1950’s he was well-received in the U.S., having lived in New York and
New Jersey for two years and having always impressed congressmen, diplomats, and devout
Catholics. But by 1963, disillusionment with Diem was pervasive in Washington and Saigon.
There was no room left for him in his own country.
If the Reverend was right, did Diem’s departure mean the immediate dominance of the
North and its charismatic revolutionary, Ho Chi Minh? In fact all it ensured was a vacuum in the
South a prospect U.S. policymakers had long feared. That vacuum might be filled not so much
with a stable Saigon government but rather with new U.S. policy: conventional war. At the end of
1963, assessing another year of mounting losses, policymakers in Washington aimed to transform
the military’s role in South Vietnam from one of “advice” to “direction.”2 Attempting to extend
their control past the limitations of Beef-Up, those who supported widening the war would find a
receptive audience in President Lyndon Johnson. Though the new president would at first resist
escalation, in 1964 he would agree to piecemeal measures that would make the build-up of ground
forces the following year all but inevitable.
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Like Diem, Ho Chi Minh’s power was not guaranteed, and waned especially during
Kennedy’s time in office. By the time Diem was overthrown, the first President and Prime Minister
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was 73 years old. He was also no longer the party leader
in Hanoi. Having chosen Le Duan to take over in 1960, by the winter of 1963 divisions within the
party had become clear. Ho found himself and other moderate colleagues sidelined by party hawks,
including Le Duan and generals Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Chi Thanh, who in November and
December debated sending North Vietnamese troops to the South and significantly strengthening
VC and NLF operations. The leaders agreed on the latter for the short-term, citing concerns that,
with the oppressive Diem government ousted, insurgents operating in South Vietnam would have
no natural opposition against which their revolutionary message could find a receptive following.
Policymakers in Hanoi saw the moment in the South as propitious; if they reinforced the VC to
deliver swift victories against the U.S.-backed state amidst a political vacuum, they could deter an
escalated U.S. intervention.3
Le Duan was well-situated to advocate for this expanded strategy, as he had on many
occasions prior to the fall of 1963. Born to a railway worker, Le Duan fought during the First
Indochina War against the French. Following the country’s division, he remained in the South and
commanded the communist party’s southern branch. In 1957, he returned to Hanoi and assumed a
position within the Politburo. During a secret trip in 1958 in which he briefly returned South, Le
Duan found that Diem’s oppression in the countryside had smashed the networks he had left
behind. It was then that he began to seriously advocate for greater support of the insurgents.4
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The decisions taken by Hanoi did not lead to immediate success, as U.S. policymakers
undercut the sound logic that guided them. Some in Washington viewed the war as still winnable,
or increasingly began to see the conflict as a grand project of saving-face. Those policymakers
advocated meeting escalation with escalation, aggression with aggression, and before Hanoi even
came to their policy conclusions, those within the U.S. military mission who had long supported a
widening of the war had prepared many plans to Americanize the war. In their minds, two years
of failed military policy in South Vietnam with the strengthened advisory role of the U.S. called
for more of the same. Simultaneously, calls to “take the war North” grew louder and enjoyed wider
support.
Rural development, and “winning hearts and minds,” remained secondary for the U.S. in
Vietnam. Interestingly, the escalation and ‘Americanization’ of the war in 1965 would coincide
with some concrete achievements in the field of rural development. Yet against a backdrop of
escalating war, and lacking a coherent ideology, these U.S.-led developments would amount to
little. Quite surprisingly, as rural development finally showed signs of life in South Vietnam,
President Johnson, a proponent of economic development, dashed its prospects. Kennedy saw
development as a tenet of counterinsurgency, as the programs intended to better rural life and dilute
the appeal of the insurgents. Johnson, a Texan and a New Dealer, was inclined to think big and
boldly with his policy initiatives. Development, he theorized, could build not only physical bridges
in the less developed nations of the world, but ideological bridges between the blocs of nations
vying for indigenous support. Johnson further saw development as a project best promoted through
international cooperation that, if fully realized, could usher in a new era of diplomacy. Crises like
those in Cuba would occur less frequently, and the UN would serve as just one arena for airing
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grievances and striking compromises. Leaders of developed nations would withdraw from war
posturing and come together in projects of international development.
Unfortunately, a rethinking of development’s role on the battlegrounds of Cold War proxy
conflicts, or at least in Vietnam, never occurred. Development would stand alone only in Johnson’s
mind, as holdovers of the Kennedy administration associated development with counterinsurgency
policy. And by November of 1963, Washington policymakers had come to the conclusion that
counterinsurgency had failed. Many ostensible defenders of that policy (including Hilsman and
Harriman), theoretically de facto defenders of rural development, would fall out of favor in the
new administration, and resign or see their influence dwindle. Meanwhile, those who pressed for
a widening of the war, such as Taylor, McNamara, and the Bundy brothers, gained responsibilities
and authority. No matter the stature of Johnson, his new approach would never have been enough
to overcome three years of ineffectual military operations.
Discounting the personnel surrounding the new president, Johnson’s New Dealer
tendencies posed problems of their own – mainly, that they were tied to his Texan identity. Though
these two traits might easily find common ground in a domestic scenario, abroad, they could were
at odds. As a New Dealer, Johnson truly believed in the revolutionary power of public works
projects. They could usher in employment, stamp out poverty, modernize a country, and rally
popular support, thereby energizing participation by the international community. Communists
and capitalists could meet in the middle, waging wars of ideology that resulted in the objective
betterment of non-industrialized societies. Johnson thought big in this way – like a Texan. Yet the
similarities stopped there. As a Texan, firm and forceful, Johnson wasn’t one to back down from
a challenge; he swaggered, bragged, and ridiculed weakness. He’d bring strength and gravitas to
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the presidency, just as he had in the Senate. Which begs the question: what course of action would
there be left to take when his New Deal overtures fell on deaf ears?

Mutual Hesitation, Mutual Escalation
Just two hours after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, on November 22, 1963 Lyndon
Johnson was sworn in as president aboard Air Force One. On his second day in office, he insisted
that the new government of generals in Saigon be made aware “that Lyndon Johnson intends to
stand by our word.” Despite Diem’s problems, Johnson was distraught with the previous
administration’s sanctioning of the coup which killed both Diem and Nhu and had long maintained
that the U.S. needed to continue its support the government, and. He believed it now paramount to
assure the new government in Saigon that it could count on its US partner. Two weeks later,
speaking on the conflict in Vietnam, he told his administration officials that “[w]e should all of us
let no day go by without asking whether we are doing everything we can to win the struggle there.”
Immediately, Johnson struck a tone more forceful and decisive than his predecessor. In late 1963,
having inherited a worsening conflict, Johnson sought to maintain the credibility and prestige
which he believed the U.S. commanded in the wake of two world wars, the Marshall Plan, and the
defense of self-determination worldwide.5
McNamara, who again visited South Vietnam in January of 1964, reaffirmed the
deteriorating situation in the country. ARVN draft-dodging and desertion was at an all-time high,
and significant GVN weapons losses in the face of emboldened VC attacks persisted unabated. As
1963 came to a close, he found that 40% of the countryside was under VC “control or predominant
influence.” In some provinces, the areas of domination totaled 90%. All VC indices – attacks,
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terrorism, sabotage, propaganda – reignited in November, following a comparative lull. Even VC
rates of defection declined. In mounting heavy attacks, the insurgents capitalized on the instability
which preceded and followed Diem’s overthrow. Beginning on October 30, VC forces led a twoweek campaign resulting in nearly 400 attacks focused mostly on watchtowers and outposts. In
late November they scored major victories, overrunning a Special Forces camp near the
Cambodian border, downing or destroying twenty U.S. aircraft in the process, and in another siege
thwarted helicopters and planes with anti-aircraft weaponry before successfully retreating.6
No doubt the VC were partially emboldened by U.S. announcements that 1,000 of the
16,500 military advisors in the South would be withdrawn by January 1, 1964. The plan, put in
place by Kennedy, was going forward, even as advisors on the ground bemoaned the “desperate”
situations in the countryside. Insurgents were taking rice-rich lands, with substantial populations
and sufficient production to sustain the movement. By December, the attacks in force declined. At
that point, the VC shifted away towards terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda; moreover, they
increasingly targeted American bases. Though these VC actions in March 1964 lacked the
magnitude of those from November, their number increased. Facing these new threats,
policymakers in Washington called for a stronger military response.
Meanwhile, military advisors in South Vietnam, fearing their phase-out would continue as
GVN losses mounted, worked to learn from the mistakes of 1963 in order to strengthen GVN
forces. In an effort to increase the mobility of the ARVN, combat units remained in the field for
20 out of 30 days on average. “Clear and hold” operations now replaced terrain sweep (or “searchand-destroy”) operations that advisors agreed had “little permanent value.” Instead they proposed
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to accelerate training for GVN forces and discontinue the strategic hamlet program until adequate
defenses could be ensured.7
Despite the mounting VC gains after November, the U.S. found itself supporting a
government largely unwilling to act. A junta of twelve military officers, who together formed the
Military Revolutionary Council, assumed control following the coup in Saigon. These officers
were French-educated, non-Communist rather than anti-Communist, and chiefly concerned with
political reforms meant to restore public confidence which Diem’s repressions had crushed. They
freed imprisoned Buddhists and encouraged political activity, though their liberal reforms created
more political factionalism than cohesion. Some members even suggested that the NLF might
participate in the future electoral processes. The new government sought to “incline towards the
West” but remain free of its influence, which in late 1963 meant freedom from foreign troops
above all else.8
In accessing the junta, military leaders like Harkins found exactly what they had feared in
the months leading up to the Diem coup: a government averse to foreign troop presence, vaguely
neutral, and open to negotiations with the North. Civilian officials were equally uneasy. William
Bundy, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, had said that Washington policymakers
simply wanted “any government which would continue to fight.” His younger brother, National
Security Advisory McGeorge Bundy, was more adamant, warning Johnson not to go the
neutralization route. Walt Rostow told Johnson that neutralization would be “the greatest setback
to U.S. interests on the world scene.”9
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In late 1963, Johnson was not fully set on escalation as the response necessary in Vietnam.
The new president desired to stand firm. In late 1963, that meant resisting the insurgents and not
entering into negotiations with Hanoi, despite calls from the junta, U.S. senators, and French
President Charles de Gaulle to do. Yet having experienced the Democrats’ debacle after the fall of
China in the late 1940’s, and having watched Joseph McCarthy run roughshod over the Senate,
Johnson feared the right-wing would pounce if he showed weakness in fighting communism
abroad. Johnson privately proclaimed that Truman and the Democrats’ “loss” of China in 1949
would be “chickenshit compared with what might happen if we lost Vietnam.” With those around
him urging escalation, coupled with his own political instincts, Johnson rejected peace talks.10
In early January of 1964, General Nguyen Khanh proposed to Washington policymakers
yet another coup. Khanh had participated in the overthrow of Diem, but was excluded from the
Military Revolutionary Council established in its aftermath. A younger, more ambitious officer,
Khanh was known to Harkins and other top U.S. generals as one of the best in South Vietnam. His
position was enhanced because he welcomed U.S. forces and personnel integration throughout
military and government ranks.
When Khanh made his proposal, the Johnson administration was struggling to decide on
the next step to take in Vietnam. All missions, civilian or military, disliked the government in
Saigon and believed it had stalled policy implementation. As the cities of South Vietnam grew
more chaotic due to unrestrained political demonstrations, the VC continued their small-scale
attacks and domination of the countryside. The administration, thus, threw its support behind
Khanh, who on January 24 launched a bloodless coup that overthrew the junta. The U.S.
recognized Khanh, despite deep reservations in Washington. A second coup had shaken a country
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already severely unstable, and the problems of Military Revolutionary Council’s carried over to
the new government fueled by personal ambition. A conversation between Harkins and General
William Westmoreland, future commander of MACV, captured the pessimistic mood. Having
been made deputy commander of MACV only days prior, as the January coup installed Khanh,
Westmoreland asked, “What do we do now?” Harkins replied, “Nothing. You just sit and wait and
see what happens.”11
Amidst the uncertainty in the South, leaders in Hanoi attempted to estimate U.S. intentions
going forward. They believed Johnson was more prone than his predecessor to change the nature
of the war by sending greater numbers of U.S. troops. North Vietnamese leaders also viewed
Diem’s overthrow, at least initially, as a mixed bag. While the vacuum created in the South would
facilitate NLF and VC operations, it also held the potential to weaken their appeal. In propaganda
and in armed conflict, insurgents in South Vietnam had long cast the Diem regime as an enemy of
the people. They claimed Diem was neither nationalist nor anti-colonialist, was politically and
socially oppressive, was unsympathetic to the plight of the peasant farmer, and supported the
privileged minorities already powerful in South Vietnam; namely, Catholics and landlords. When
Diem fell, the mass political unrest that ensued in Southern cities in November 1963 was
symptomatic of the sweeping liberalization that the junta had ushered in. Without the devil in
Saigon, Hanoi worried, the insurgents’ allure might wane.
Hanoi’s decisions in September 1961 to support the southern insurgents had bolstered VC
numbers by 30,000-40,000 over the course of two years. But these troops were mostly southerners
who, following the partition resulting from the Geneva Conference of 1954, had fled to the North
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in fear of reprisals. They had vowed to return, and had largely done so by the fall of 1963.12 The
leaders at the Ninth Party Plenum on November 22, 1963, did not decide on the “gamble” to
heavily engage in the South as some historians have claimed. Rather they determined to reinforce
Southern insurgents significantly while the war was to remain protracted, as the leaders adopted
the language of “gradual advance.” The resolution stated, “it is time for the North to increase aid
to the South, [and] the North must bring into fuller play its role as the revolutionary base for the
whole nation.” The North anticipated that the U.S. would widen the war, because their failures in
the South would encourage the Americans to increase troop levels to bolster GVN forces. To this
effect, alongside the increase in industrial production and mobilization, the resolution made clear
that national reunification would define the struggle for the South:
We should indoctrinate cadre, Party members, and the people in North Viet-Nam about
their responsibility toward the Revolution … in order to increase their revolutionary
spirit, their determination, their patriotism, and encourage them … to be ready to fulfill
their obligation toward the southern Revolution under any form and in any circumstance.
In the meantime, the resolution held, the nature of support towards Southern insurgents would not
change, but increase.13
The misconception underlying the “gamble” may have come from North Vietnamese
Colonel Bui Tin’s report from South Vietnam. Dispatched in October of 1963, the colonel was
sent South to assess if the Ho Chi Minh trail (then only bike-wide) could be widened to
accommodate Northern troop regiments. Reporting in the spring of 1964, the colonel found the
trail ripe for widening. Yet this assessment was overshadowed by his pessimistic report on the
Southern forces. Northern and Southern insurgents, together constituting the PAVN, had only

12

Dr. John Prados, “The Road South: The Ho Chi Minh Trail,” in Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam
War Revisited, ed. Andrew Wiest (Oxford: Osprey, 2006), 81.
13
“Resolution of the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers’ Party,” December 1963, in
The Vietnam War: An International History in Docs, 71-72.

87

recently formed regiments; they were poorly trained and would be unable to resist the ARVN,
which was set to grow under the new U.S.-Khanh relationship. Bui Tin concluded that Southern
liberation would not arrive without significant deployment of North Vietnamese regular units.14
Johnson’s own advisers shared Hanoi’s belief that the president was prone to widening the
war. Speaking at the Honolulu Conference on November 20, McNamara proposed the Department
of Defense expand and take over all covert operations in North Vietnam from the CIA. While
McNamara proposed shifting the burden in Vietnam towards the U.S. military, McGeorge Bundy
(following Kennedy’s death) revised a draft of NSAM 273, removing language that emphasized
building up the ARVN. But Johnson signed the memorandum into action on November 26, on the
contingency that it aimed to remove most U.S. troops from the country by the end of 1965.15
The new president was searching for a way to stand strong in southeast Asia, not so much
to win the war but in order to aovid being the first president to lose a war. At this time his domestic
agenda, The Great Society, had the highest priority, and to lose in Vietnam (in Johnson’s mind,
and egged on by his advisers) would put his domestic agenda at risk. Therefore, in the early weeks
of his presidency, he pursued an unclear policy of pressure without force. As McNamara wrote in
his memoirs, Johnson was “[g]rasping for a way to hurt North Vietnam without direct U.S. military
action.” This was partly due to the new president’s self-conception, as “just an inherited trustee.”
Until elected to a four-year term, he felt he lacked the political capital to go to war in Vietnam:
“we haven’t got any Congress … and we haven’t got any mothers that will go with us.” Still,
Johnson’s wavering would not stand up against those who had long been pushing overt actions
against the North and less reliance on the ARVN to get the job done in the South. With Khanh
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now leading South Vietnam, 1964 would prove to be a year in which those who advocated for
greater shows of strength would gain greater influence.16

Joining the Chorus
As the year began, the hawks scored only small victories. Following McNamara’s request
from the November Honolulu conference, the CIA and the Pentagon had drawn up a three-phase
plan of new actions to take against Hanoi. The plan intended to “increase[e] punishment upon
North Vietnam … create pressures,” and ultimately convince the Northern government “to desist
from its aggressive policies.” Ironically, the notion persisted that the success of the insurgents
could only be tied to substantial aid from the North, even as leaders in Hanoi had decided on
restraint a month earlier. The campaigns of November 1963 which so shook U.S. personnel in
South Vietnam were mounted by VC troops whose strength had been building locally throughout
the duration of Beef-Up. And while Khanh initially appeared to be the saber-rattler the U.S. mission
sought, by overthrowing the Military Revolutionary Council he had ejected a primarily Buddhistdominated ruling group, ensuring only further political discord in South Vietnam. Regardless, on
January 16 Johnson agreed to only Phase I of the three proposed, giving the Pentagon greater
control of covert operations mounted north of the DMZ. Air strikes were too hard to deny,
represented too great a commitment, and risked involving Hanoi’s allies in Communist China and
Soviet Russia. Bombing Hanoi would have to wait.17
In mid-February, Ambassador Lodge called for retaliatory attacks on the North if
Americans continue to be targeted in southern terrorist attacks. Johnson, who feared Lodge as a
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potential Republican contender that November, was predisposed to heed the ambassador’s calls
for action. By March 1, William Bundy had drafted what would serve as the “framework” for
bombing North Vietnam, which McNamara was happy to sell Johnson on. The plan called for
bombing rail lines and industrial complexes, hurting North Vietnam’s capacity for production as
well as its ability to receive supplies from China. The move would be undeniable and overt, not
only inflicting damage on the North but openly demonstrating U.S. resolve in the region.
Policymakers hoped it would assure the Khanh government of U.S. commitment to the new regime
in the South. This show of support was needed, as McNamara’s December assessment of the
ARVN was bleak. He believed the forces needed a 50,000 man, $50 million increase, and
suggested Khanh institute national conscription. Bombing North Vietnam, policymakers believed,
might encourage Khanh to mobilize more quickly.18
The proposal was designed with Johnson’s concerns in mind, and presented what William
Bundy believed to be the least risk of sparking a greater conflict. But Johnson turned down the
framework two days later, and instead had McGeorge Bundy revise the recommendations so that
policy now classed bombing North Vietnam as a high-risk action. On March 4, Johnson met with
the JCS and again resisted calls for increased military pressure on North Vietnam. The JCS
envisioned a naval blockade as well as the destruction (bombing) of military and economic targets
as a means of applying this pressure. Later that month, Johnson’s military aide, Brigadier General
Chester Clifton, warned the president that the JCS were dissenting. They felt Johnson was avoiding
the right decisions, and that the failure to apply such needed pressures could result in a policy
debacle. The JCS did not wish to be part of an “Asian Bay of Pigs.”19
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With policy edging towards escalation, civilian programs had no priority. As discussed in
the previous chapter, the end of the Diem regime coincided with the discovery that the strategic
hamlet program was in complete shambles. Found to be overextended, falsely-acclaimed, and
generally defenseless in the fall of 1963, the hamlets were easy targets of the large-scale VC attacks
which ensued that November. For this reason, the counterinsurgency program moved into a new
phase that January: New Life Hamlets. The buzz-phrase transition, from “rural development” to
“rural reconstruction,” coincided with the destruction wrought on the hamlets following the
November attacks. In mid-March of 1964, MACV reported that hamlet militiamen, citing a lack
of representation within their newly-appointed local governments, were turning in their guns and
refusing to fight. In some provinces, their numbers had declined by as much as 60%.20
The MACV findings complimented McNamara’s report that month: “irregular forces, i.e.,
Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, are ineffective and the Hamlet Militia have virtually
disintegrated.” In some cases, over 40% of trained militias never received arms to start. Though
most province chiefs had been replaced with new officials not beholden to the previous Diem
regime, the Khanh government had not yet improved the national government’s outreach to these
areas. Moreover, much of the countryside so thoroughly dominated by VC guerrillas and villages
controlled by the NLF that roads were impassable. Strategic hamlets would be rebooted, at best,
slowly. This process would have little bearing on policymakers in Washington, who had months
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prior deemed the operation a failure, and felt the situation in South Vietnam going forward would
be best solved with force.21
McNamara’s March report was also noteworthy in that it generated pessimistic comments
from John McCone, Director of the CIA. Oddly enough, McCone advocated for actions against
the North similar to those that McNamara, Taylor, Lodge, and the Bundy brothers were calling for
– namely, overt. But McCone felt overt actions against Hanoi were best saved for moments where
extreme pressure was necessary; in the case of an emergency, or as a way to bring the South
Vietnamese conflict to a swift end rather than risk dragging it out. McCone saw overt actions at
two ends of a spectrum, whereas the policymakers working to convince Johnson of bombing Hanoi
immediately saw it as the only way forward.
McNamara’s report made its way to the JCS, and then the president, with McCone’s
comments omitted. Upon discovering this, members of the JCS were furious, particularly because
Johnson had signed off on McNamara’s report without having read the dissent. Despite this
difference in mindset, McCone’s comments were omitted chiefly because he disagreed with the
bulk of McNamara’s report. He “believe[d] that the situation in South Vietnam [was] so serious
that it call[ed] for more immediate and positive action than [McNamara had] proposed.”22 In
essence he was more, not less, hawkish.
When McCone met Johnson at his ranch in late December of 1963, the new president made
it clear he wanted to “‘change the image of the CIA’ from a cloak and dagger role.” Johnson had
long been suspicious of the Langley spooks. He disliked the power Attorney General Robert
21
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Kennedy wielded in nearly every matter of policy, and intelligence and covert operations were no
different. Similarly, the CIA had a long history in Vietnam, having udertaken covert operations
(albeit unsuccessfully for the most part) since the 1950’s with the assistance of Ed Lansdale. Now,
it seemed that Johnson would get his way. McCone agreed with the new president, reasserting the
CIA’s primary mission as collecting, analyzing, and reporting intelligence. Unfortunately, in
March of 1964, Johnson didn’t like the intelligence he received. When McCone did deliver his
pessimistic remarks to Johnson, he found a president comfortable with the more favorable report
his defense secretary had just presented. At this stage, Johnson effectively closed the door on his
CIA director. He received infrequent intelligence briefs, especially from the director himself, and
it’s unclear if Johnson from March to October of 1964 paid much attention to CIA intelligence
estimates.23
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Military intelligence was what Johnson would pay most attention to in 1964, though not
all reports equally. Harkins, the commander of MACV who only two years prior had dubbed the
staggering loss at Ap Bac a “certain victory,” was falling out of favor in Washington. Similar to
McCone, his reports had become too pessimistic. MACV reports in the spring that year focused
on VC political and military successes, as well as the impoverishment of the GVN paramilitary
forces. They were right to depict a gloomy outlook. At home, the U.S. was reading more about the
vastly superior VC, who ably ambushed and killed U.S. rangers (specially trained in guerrilla
warfare) on their way to aiding isolated hamlets. As the rainy season approached, the VC, now
with heavier support from the North, was back on the offensive. GVN forces suffered serious
losses in life and weapons, and as the VC quickly slipped across the border to safety, Cambodian
forces did little to stop the movement.24
News reports that spring wondering left interested Americans wondering what Johnson’s
next move might be. The public was already aware by March that Robert McNamara favored some
“harassment” of the North in order to get things done. From an extreme corner, presidential
contender Barry Goldwater proposed nuclear weapons be used in Vietnam. But in April, former
Vice President Richard Nixon, another presidential contender and a more moderate voice,
reaffirmed his view that the U.S. ought to remain “properly committed to help these people” and
not retreat in Vietnam. Most alarmingly for Johson, neither of these Republican candidates won
the 1964 New Hampshire primary, losing to the Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot
Lodge Jr., in a write-in campaign. As the spring continued, Johnson edged slowly towards
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capitulating to overt force. Some of his sources said he was losing in Vietnam; others said he
wasn’t. But both sides advocated for resolve and greater force in turning the tide.25

American Firepower
Ten days after the ambassador’s primary win, Johnson cabled Lodge in Saigon.
Policymakers considered actions against the North “premature,” but were nonetheless in the
pipeline on a contingency basis. Johnson also thought it best that Lodge travel to France to meet
with de Gaulle, a mission “precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of neutralization
wherever it rears its ugly head.” No plan or show of resolve, other than building South Vietnamese
forces, was to be implemented in the meantime, but Johnson was clearly losing patience with those
who didn’t advocate a firm stance in Vietnam.26 As spring turned to summer, the administration
prepared the ultimate contingency plan. On May 23, William Bundy penned a “Draft Resolution
for Congress on Actions in Southeast Asia.” In the event that U.S. forces were presented with any
hint of Northern aggression, the Johnson administration would ram an enabling resolution through
Congress. The resolution authorized presidential use of force without a formal declaration of war,
and did so on the grounds of infringement upon South Vietnam’s sovereignty, as guaranteed in the
1954 Geneva accords:
To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared,
upon the request of the government of South Viet Nam or the government of Laos, to use
all measures including the commitment of armed forces to assist that government in the
defense of its independence and territorial integrity against aggression or subversion
supported, controlled or directed from any Communist country.27
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With even less precise language, the resolution would pass through Congress in early August
following the Tonkin Gulf incident. The nature of the resolution – drafted well before the incident
which it claimed to respond to – would later become the subject of serious controversy.
On June 20, 1964, William Westmoreland took over command of MACV from Paul
Harkins. Upon his appointment, Westmoreland provoked many internal objections. Generals
believed him unqualified, lacking leadership skills, and not prone to understanding the dimensions
of a counterinsurgency war (as if that still mattered).28 Following his appointment, on June 23 the
president announced the retirement of Ambassador Lodge. Policymakers in Washington had long
called for this, citing Saigon reports that the ambassador had no new ideas and was not
communicating with MACV. The next day, Lodge made clear that he had retired to aid Governor
William Scranton’s campaign for the Republican party’s nomination – essentially, “to prevent Mr.
Goldwater from gaining the Republican nomination.” He would be replaced by Maxwell Taylor.29
Effectively, Johnson had replaced the pessimistic hawk leadership in Saigon with
optimistic hawks. One of Westmoreland’s first requests was for 900 advisors; in July, he asked for
4,200. Meanwhile, Washington and Hanoi sent each other conciliatory messages to no avail.
Through ICC Commissioner J. Blair Seaborn, Washington alerted Hanoi that they wished only to
contain the North and did not support regime change in Hanoi, but “[U.S.] patience was growing
thin.” Washington received no response. Later, through French Communist Party circles, Hanoi
conceded that it would accept a partitioned Vietnam indefinitely, so long as the U.S. agreed to
completely withdraw. This time, Hanoi received no response. Both administrations had issued the
communications while simultaneously increasing aid to their respective clients.30
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Part of new U.S. measures included more covert raids of North Vietnamese coastal targets
and DESOTO patrols off the country’s coast. Though naval destroyers were sent only to collect
intelligence on the enemy, on August 2 the Maddox fired on three North Vietnamese patrol boats
after being pursued into the middle of the Tonkin Gulf. The patrols dispersed, the torpedoes from
the Maddox missing their targets, and the showdown on international waters was over.
U.S. combat troops were put on high alert. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other members
of Johnson’s NSC were delighted that Hanoi might be “rattled” by new U.S. forcefulness. They
all but welcomed a retaliatory attack. On the night of August 4, it looked as though they had gotten
their wish. The Maddox and an accompanying destroyer Turner Joy reported an attack by torpedo
boats in the night, to which they had retaliated massively, firing off rounds for hours. Reports from
commanders on the scene and nearby quickly revealed that the incident may have been nothing at
all. Captain John Herrick, commander of the Maddox, only hours after the attacks reported that the
whole thing may have not occurred:
Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful.
Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many
reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any
further action taken.
From the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga stationed nearby, Commander John Stockdale overflew the
purported exchange and reported “[n]o boats … no boat wakes, no ricochets off boats, no boat
impacts, no torpedo wakes – nothing but the black sea and American firepower.”31
In the hours that ensued, McNamara vacillated. First, he cabled commanders on the scene,
demanding to know if the attack had really happened or not. But as negative testimony came
through the channels, McNamara chose not to report the bulk of it to the president. After all,
Johnson had agreed with McNamara – just thirty minutes following the first reports of attack –
31
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that retaliatory measures were necessary. Just before midnight on August 4, Johnson interrupted
national television to address the American people regarding what he understood as the facts in
the Tonkin Gulf incident. No U.S. soldiers were killed, and at least two enemy vessels were
believed to be sunk. But the renewed hostilities (the August 2 exchange had been reported on),
Johnson claimed, “brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for
peace and security in southeast Asia.”32 The next day, a resolution similar to William Bundy’s late
May draft was placed before Congress.33 It passed the in Senate 88-2, in the House 416-0, and was
signed into law on August 10.
Johnson’s statement the night prior did not align with the resolution. The president
maintained that this overt attack by the North, though supposedly unprovoked, called for the U.S.
to take an increased defensive posture:
The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to
the government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response,
for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear
to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war.34
Less than two hours later, U.S. planes bombed four torpedo boat bases and an oil storage facility
in North Vietnam. Four North Vietnamese were killed during the bombings. These initial actions
were indeed limited, retaliatory measures unlikely to provoke a widening of the war. But the
Congressional resolution which stemmed from the Tonkin Gulf incident was unprecedented,
giving Johnson unrestricted powers in pursuing war-like courses of action without having to seek
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the traditional approval of Congress for a declaration of war. Though Johnson had yet to win
election in 1964, he had secured an impressive mandate from Congress.
Johnson’s actions concerning the Tonkin Gulf gave him a whopping 30-point boost in his
approval rating. In the eyes of many hardliners, Johnson had finally solidified that he would stand
strong in Vietnam; yet his continuous assurances that U.S. troops would not be sent to another
Asian theater worried centrist voters who opposed such an intervention. As Johnson campaigned
through the final three months, however, chaos erupted within the South Vietnam government.
Khanh had become widely unpopular, and that fall resigned as Prime Minister (though he was not
officially ousted from the country until early 1965). In the meantime, generals in Saigon vied for
power all throughout the fall.35 Meanwhile, in September, Hanoi for the first time deployed North
Vietnamese regular units to the South. The insurgent cause thrived with this addition.36
A September intelligence estimate concluded that North Vietnamese domination of South
Vietnam and Laos did not guarantee the loss of all of Southeast Asia, effectively challenging the
rationale for U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the “domino theory.” Still, Johnson’s advisors
pushed for escalation on exactly those principles. In November, Johnson won 44 states plus DC,
with an overwhelming 61.1% of the popular vote. Now with such a sweeping victory, he moved
forward emboldened. Less than a month later, Johnson decided on a two-phase expansion of the
war. While the first phase would intensify the already-existing air strikes in Laos and covert actions
across the DMZ, the second called for a long-term, escalating air campaign against North Vietnam.
Phase II, however, would not be implemented until February 7, 1965 as Operation Flaming Dart.
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But Westmoreland received authorization to regularly use B-52s that winter, and sporadic
bombings began to target North Vietnam in reprisal operations. Similarly, the number of armed
helicopters in South Vietnam was rising, totaling 300 by the end of the year. By the end of 1964,
the number of U.S. advisors in South Vietnam would reach 23,300.37
On February 7, 1965, at 1:50 am, VC soldiers opened fire at Camp Holloway in Pleiku.
The Camp, a helicopter facility, was first constructed by the U.S. army in August of 1962. The VC
attack left eight U.S. soldiers dead, another 126 wounded, and 25 aircraft either destroyed or
damaged. Just hours after the attack, on his way to Washington from Saigon, McGeorge Bundy
telegrammed the president. In the immediate aftermath of the Camp Holloway attack, Bundy made
an impassioned plea for action. He called for “A Policy of Sustained Reprisal,” in which VC
attacks and terror acts would be met with tit-for-tat U.S. air and naval strikes.
Ambassador Taylor had cautioned Johnson against the deployment of U.S. troops in early
January of that year, arguing that the Vietnamese lacked not the manpower but the motivation
(what Bundy called “an appearance of wariness” and “a worrisome lassitude”) to effectively
prosecute the war. With this in mind, Bundy viewed “sustained reprisal” as a comfortable middleground. Furthermore, Bundy’s plea considered not only U.S. strategy, but U.S. prestige. This was
a theme he and other advisors had been pushing on Johnson for over a year now. Johnson’s greatest
fears met in Vietnam. To lose Vietnam was to lose political capital and the Great Society. And as
the first president to lose a war, Johnson knew his prestige and his country’s would plummet.
Bundy warned:
The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are
directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden on the Vietnamese
themselves, and there is no way of negotiating ourselves out of Vietnam which offers any
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serious promise at present … To be an American in Saigon today is to have a gnawing
feeling that time is against us.38
The domino theory and the prestige theory now paralleled each other, and the application of force
seemed the surest way for America to save face in Southeast Asia.
Johnson agreed and the same day authorized Operation Flaming Dart. From February 724, the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces flew joint bombing missions north of the DMZ. On
March 2, Johnson inaugurated Operation Rolling Thunder, which intended to accomplish much of
the same that Flaming Dart had: improve South Vietnamese morale, deter North Vietnam, and
interrupt the supplying of the war effort in the South. Rolling Thunder would last until November
1968. In the process, it would deliver 643,000 tons of bombs, over 100,000 more than the U.S. had
delivered in the Pacific Theater in World War II.39 In the face of this U.S. escalation, the NLF
reaffirmed their own resolve. In a statement issued on March 22, the insurgents proclaimed: “Even
if we are to carry out the struggle for ten, twenty years or longer, and to suffer great difficulties
and hardships, we are prepared to fight up until not a single American aggressor is seen on our
soil.”40 Their combined force in South Vietnam was estimated that month at 140,000.41 As the
spring began, both sides dug in deeper.
With the arrival of planes, Westmoreland felt the need to request troops for security
purposes. His request was granted and, on March 8, 3,500 U.S. Marines arrived in South Vietnam
with strict orders to protect the Danang airfield – they were not to engage the VC. They were there
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only for defensive purposes. Taylor was nonetheless upset. Returning to Washington for
conferences that month, he proposed a wide-range of non-military measures for South Vietnam
going forward. These included increased counterespionage and improved coastal transport, but
also the clearing of slums, greater aid to education, and land reform. However, as he put it, he
found a president uninterested in his reservations and “having crossed the Rubicon on February 7
… now off for Rome on the double.”42 Johnson asked the JCS for proposals that would “kill more
VC” that month, and they came back to him with varying troop proposals. In mid-April, two more
Marine battalion teams landed in South Vietnam. At that point, there were 33,000 U.S. troops in
South Vietnam, with an additional 18,000 on the way.43
As troops deployed throughout the spring and summer, debate raged in the White House.
Many describe Johnson as inexperienced, even inept, in foreign policy. For this reason he had kept
Kennedy’s principal advisors, and for this reason he had always sought consensus on his decisions.
In July, he found little. While advocates against mass deployments viewed the summer as their
last chance to keep the administration from plunging into a quagmire, those who favored sending
U.S. troops didn’t present the president with rosy estimates. General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of
the JCS, when asked by Johnson what it would take “to do the job,” warned that it could take
700,000 to 1 million men and up to seven years. A close advisor of McNamara, assuming a
deployment of 200,000-400,000 over the near term,44 saw only a 50-50 chance of success by 1968.
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But the president saw large deployments as a middle ground; he wanted to give Westmoreland
what the MACV commander desired, he didn’t want to back down, and he didn’t want to provoke
Hanoi’s allies by going “all-out.” In July, U.S. strength in Vietnam stood at 75,000. On July 28,
Johnson authorized a vast deployment, which would swiftly bring combined U.S. strength to
125,000. Again, in November, he authorized even more, and the U.S. commitment climbed to
219,000. By the end of 1965, 184,314 U.S. troops were already on the ground.45

Going Off the Diving Board
The build-up of troops or “Americanization” of the war in Vietnam which Johnson initiated
in 1965 partly reflected US isolation from its allies. By the summer of 1965, the U.S. understood
that it would largely be fighting its war alone, though in late May of 1964, Johnson had angrily
posed to McGeorge Bundy, “What the hell is Vietnam worth to me? What is Laos worth to me?
What is it worth to this country?” He then lamented, “Now, we’ve got a treaty but, hell, everybody
else’s got a treaty out there and they’re not doing anything about it.” Regarding SEATO signatories
like Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Australia, he wasn’t wrong. Well before Johnson
“Americanized” the war, Western nations had made clear they had no intention to aid the U.S. in
widened military adevntures in Vietnam. By June, West Germany, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy had ruled out any potential military presence. That same month
Australia agreed to double its military presence in South Vietnam, raising its regional presence to
60 army instructors and six air force transport planes. Pakistan openly supported de Gaulle’s calls
for neutralization in the region, and therefore, despite being a key SEATO member, appeared less
likely to contribute militarily. In August, Japan agreed to provide $1.5 million in aid to Khanh’s
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government in the form of medicines, ambulances, infrastructure equipment, and radios.46 Only
South Korea provided a few thousand troops.
At the same time, Johnson looked for a way to avoid further escalation. Reports on the first
six months of 1964 were against him: the monthly average of VC-initiated incidents in 1964
(2,100) exceeded that of 1963 (1,500). Similarly, while GVN forces lost 4,700 weapons in combat,
VC forces lost only 2,600.47 As Kennedy’s Vietnam problems persisted, the situation suggested a
new approach was called for. Johnson apparently sensed the need for more than military measures.
During the summer of 1964, he repeated calls for development that he had made as vice president
years earlier. In a June address to Congress, Johnson laid out his vision not only of development,
but cooperation:
This great river basin [the Mekong], one of the world’s ten largest watersheds, brings
untold flood damage each year. Yet it offers the prospect of irrigated lands and navigable
streams, of abundant power and increased food and fiber production. Properly harnessed,
it could triple the region’s rice crop … Economically, it could rival our own TVA.
Politically, it already provides the bond of common hope which causes these nations to
forego ancient enmities and plan together for a common future … we are prepared to
challenge the Soviet Union, which shares skills in river development, to match our own
efforts in a planned program for the Mekong … This is the larger vision we have of
Southeast Asia. We envision a future when the competition will be waged in taming
rivers, in building factories, in feeding people – not in frightening them.48
Johnson imagined international cooperation and modernization as a way to escape war.
While historians are keen to point out the futility of Johnson’s cooperative development
proposals, they shy away from identifying exactly why they held so little promise. For starters, the
Mekong doesn’t run in North Vietnam. In fact the Mekong enters Vietnam south of the DMZ.
Only under reunification would the North realize any direct benefits. U.S. policymakers who did
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believe in this proposal proved themselves no better attuned to the situation in Vietnam than
previous administrations. Even if such a venture had proved palatable to Hanoi, the insurgent
forces in South Vietnam were not fully dependent on Hanoi; they were inextricably connected
only in their insurgency (and during Johnson’s tenure, the increased aid which Hanoi provided).
The NLF and the VC would never have agreed to such an initiative, having ably controlled the
majority of South Vietnam and resisted U.S.-supported GVN forces for nearly a decade.
In March of 1965, Johnson addressed Asian development in more concrete terms. In a
rather short, six-point address, Johnson laid out what appeared to be terms of U.S. assistance:
The United States looks forward to the day when the people and governments of all southeast
Asia may be free from terror, subversion, and assassination--when they will need not military
support and assistance against aggression, but only economic and social cooperation for progress
in peace. Even now, in Viet-Nam and elsewhere, there are major programs of development
which have the cooperation and support of the United States. Wider and bolder programs can be
expected in the future from Asian leaders and Asian councils – and in such programs we would
want to help. This is the proper business of our future cooperation.49
“Point 5,” as it was referred to in the international press, drew easy criticism from communist
ideology. Following the speech, the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia telegrammed Dean
Rusk and McGeorge Bundy:
Local reaction to point 5 of president's March 25 statement on Viet-Nam has been
derisive with Depeche (Pro-Communist) editorial saying that “arrogant attitude of
imperialist state which seeks to dictate its conditions in exchange for its aid” is
unacceptable and attempt to impose U.S. “slavery”.50
Though the editorial may appear hyperbolic, it underscores that, no matter how grandiose his
proposals, Johnson could not escape the realm of the Cold War. Whether he liked it or not, Vietnam
was a proxy conflict, in which ideology mattered. Saigon’s legitimacy had been lost for a decade
in the eyes of many, and the massive aid the U.S. provided lent itself easily to accusations that
49
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South Vietnam was a “puppet state.” In 1964, the total economic assistance provided solely by
USAID was estimated at $123 million, and it was expected to rise in 1965.
This suggests another barrier to Johnson’s joint development proposals. In the wake of the
Sino-Soviet split, Johnson may have looked to the Soviet Union to assist him in dealing an
international blow to the growing specter of Chinese communism just north of Hanoi. U.S.
intelligence showed that, for much of 1965, Beijing denied Moscow the ability to establish a
significant military presence in North Vietnam. They did so chiefly by their refusal to provide an
unrestricted “air-corridor” across which Soviet aid could be freely transported. In this way, Beijing
consolidated their control over North Vietnam.51 Additionally, the U.S. national security
bureaucracy in 1964-1965 increasingly viewed the Soviet Union as more aligned with themselves
than China.52 With this vague notion of a joint mission in containment already in play, it was easy
for Johnson to continually frame communist China as the enemy on the border of Vietnam who
every second threatened to encroach as it had during the Korean War. In this light, it seemed
feasible that the Soviet Union could be brought to the table.
The most convincing explanation why that Johnson’s development failed to gain traction
lay in the previous years of US involvement. Policymakers had long believed that, through
development, they could modernize, and in the process save, Vietnam. But U.S. actions in Vietnam
always stressed that security must precede development. Since development in Vietnam was never
a priority, it lacked a track record with which Americans could convince Vietnamese of its worth.
U.S. policymakers accepted modernization and industrialization as objective goods, but the
peasants of Vietnam did not. As one South Vietnamese officer would tell Johnson at a Honolulu
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conference in 1966, “we are a small country and we don’t have pretensions to building a Great
Society. We just want to have a better society.”53
This plea did not change Johnson’s thinking in 1966, and it wouldn’t have deterred him
from his “Peace Without Conquest” speech in April of. The president spoke from a position not
only of power, but compassion and isolation. “Each day,” Johnson said, the people of southeast
Asia “rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrestle existence from the soil. They are
often wracked by disease, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.” Invoking
America’s current efforts in Vietnam, as well as its reconstruction of Europe in the aftermath of
World War II, the president maintained that “[t]he American people have helped generously in
times past in these works. Now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of
man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.” He went on:
The first step is for the countries of southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded
cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in
the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible … For our part I will ask the
Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway.
And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in
this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress.
Johnson believed development in the Mekong to be the centerpiece of this grand vision of
international cooperation. The speech also established the foundation for the Asian Development
Bank, an institution that would theoretically bankroll important development ventures such as the
Mekong Valley Project.54
Unsurprisingly, these New Deal overtures elicited no response from Hanoi and Moscow.
Johnson continued to lay the institutional foundation for such ventures, but to no avail. In May of
1965, he informed the UN ECAFE’s Special Mekong Committee that the U.S. was prepared to
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foot half the bill of the first major Mekong dam, the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos. That proposition
anticipateed establishment of the Asian Development Bank in 1966. Even after Johnson’s “Peace
Without Conquest” speech, his administration and the UN worked to make the Soviet Union and
North Vietnam signatories of the Bank’s charter. Both countries refused.55
Johnson’s big proposal for development as a road to peace had flopped. As Fitzgerald
writes, “[i]t would have been the greatest piece of pork-barrel legislation in history.”56 But
considering Johnson’s deep belief in public works, his passion for his own Great Society, and his
visceral hatred for “that bitch of a war on the other side of the world,”57 his proposal’s failure must
have represented more than the mere failure of pork-barrel politics. Internationally, he was
isolated: he had reached out to his allies for aid, and then to his adversaries for peace. From both
sides, he was snubbed. Meanwhile, U.S. bombs were falling in Vietnam.
At a cabinet room meeting on July 21, Johnson discussed leaving Vietnam altogether.
Under Secretary of State George Ball posed the U.S. “cut [its] losses in SVN” and “let the
government decide it doesn’t want us to stay there.” Johnson replied, “Wouldn’t all these countries
say Uncle Sam is a paper tiger – wouldn’t we lose credibility breaking the word of three presidents
– if we set it up as you proposed[?] It would seem to be an irreparable blow.”58 The next day, at
another cabinet room meeting, Johnson was joined by military advisors. Face with yet another of
Westmoreland’s requests for more troops, Johnson debated with those present. When he expressed
his concern over foreign reactions to such large deployments (citing China in particular), he was
counseled succinctly, “Least desirable alternative is getting out. Second least is doing what we are
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doing. Best is to get in and get the job done.” The president later asked, “Are we starting something
that in 2-3 years we can’t finish?” Another advisor replied, “It is costly to strangle slowly, but the
chances of losing are less if we move in.” Johnson understood his counseling. To give in to
Westmoreland’s demands was for the U.S. to find itself in a completely new war. “This is going
off the diving board,” the president remarked.59
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Conclusion
Throughout 1964 and 1965, civilians attempted to convince the Johnson administration
that development was not worth giving up on. They presented what they believed were examples
of concrete progress to help development’s case. A litany of information was provided. USAID
workers had helped construct simple, economical water wheels and wooden windmills throughout
the countryside. Fertilizer was being introduced to farmers who had never used it before, and in
1964 USAID would procure twice as much as it had the previous year. An improved variety of
sweet potato increased yields from 5-10 times over the average. By February of 1965, hog cholera
had been eliminated in South Vietnam. These projects sought not only to develop, but modernize
South Vietnam. One report touts the success of “[t]eaching the primitive Montagnard tribal people
how to use water buffalo as beasts of burden rather than as sacrificial animals.” Local elections
were encouraged and assisted. Enrollment in elementary schools stood at 1,400,000 in 1963, up
from 300,000 in 1955. Due to a USAID-led vaccination initiative, the malaria incidence rate in
large areas dropped from 7.22% in 1958 to 0.77% in 1962.1
Still, the case for development was hard to make. When counterinsurgency was deemed a
failure in the fall of 1963, development was as well. The strategic hamlet program in particular
had convinced policymakers that development, at its best, would prove a distraction. The
countryside required safety above all else for these projects to take, and the countryside was far
from safe by the summer of 1965. But 1963 also signified the climax of U.S. aid to South Vietnam
(within the 15-year period examined, 1950-1965). Putting aside the failure of counterinsurgency,
what modernization could be celebrated at the end of 1963? The results were damning: a
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countryside full of angry and susceptible peasant farmers who used on average less than 33
kilowatt hours per capita per year.2
Other civilian metrics implored policymakers for support and depicted a dire situation, and
in the process underscored the prominence in the war effort. In May of 1965, there were
approximately 750 doctors within all of South Vietnam; 400 of them served in the army, further
depleting a country already in desperate need of adequate medical care and personnel. That same
month, USAID announced its intentions to increase its presence in South Vietnam from 540 to 663
“in the near future.”3 Why bother? In April, William Gaud, Administrator of USAID, had reported
at a White House meeting on Vietnam that USAID had “no new projects.”4
In the 1950’s, some policymakers voiced concerns about the “two-pronged policy” which
the U.S. began to pursue. To bring guns and butter to a distant land seemed contradictory, and
many predicted that something would have to give. As the insurgent crisis grew in South Vietnam
during the late 1950’s, the Eisenhower administration prepared for a war that would never come.
The military mission stripped power from the civilian mission so that a significant GVN defense
apparatus could be built up. This was the first instance of prioritizing security above all other
initiatives. This prioritization made sense, as minds of the Eisenhower administration believed that
a strong state relied on the existence of a strong military.
They were not wrong. As the military stripped the civilian mission of power and influence,
they bolstered a government under Ngo Dinh Diem with a massive security apparatus. This would
only further complicate the project of development. Where government workers were supposed to
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instigate civic action and development projects, they instead extracted bribes from and harassed
peasant farmer populations. Peasants of the countryside found themselves unable to identify or
even like their government. With his U.S.-backed military forces, Diem drove peasants towards
the southern insurgents. Communist, nationalist, and simply anti-Diem propaganda was met with
broad appeal, especially following land schemes like the painful and disruptive “agrovilles,” and
later the strategic hamlets.
When Kennedy took office, there was a reorientation of policy. Development looked as
though it would receive new attention. But Kennedy was also given to resisting communism, and
was not going to back down in Vietnam. Early on, Kennedy even believed Vietnam could win his
administration some redemption in the wake of losing Laos and bungling Cuba. Counterinsurgency
in Vietnam, therefore, would be the answer: a package deal, which would combat guerrilla warfare
with advanced paramilitary techniques, all the while squashing the appeal of the guerrilla with
development projects that would modernize and win over the “hearts and minds” of the
Vietnamese society.
This proved problematic as the situation in Vietnam deteriorated. Kennedy’s
counterinsurgency doctrine tied military defense measures and development in a mutually
exclusive package: they worked in conjunction. Yet, as some policymakers of the 1950’s had
worried, one of the two prongs in the policy would have to give. Development did.
Counterinsurgency, originally envisioned as a grand policy of moving parts, was not a process.
Once security was achieved, and once the population was controlled, then it could be reached and
undergo development. As the insurgency in the South worsened throughout the early 1960’s,
security seemed less and less achievable. The failure of force begot more force; rural life was again
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traumatically disrupted with the strategic hamlet program; those charged with championing
development, like Roger Hilsman, Walt Rostow, and U.A. Johnson, proved to be impatient hawks.
With that, the Johnson administration had little concern for development. Johnson himself
talked of development projects on a grand scale, likely the only way he conceived of such things.
But these projects had a dual purpose: modernization, as well as diplomacy. They weren’t meant
to prevent the appeal of the guerrilla as much as question the way global competitions were waged,
and inevitably expose the non-modernized world to the benefit of American technology, public
works, and “can-do” attitude. Johnson wanted cooperative efforts to replace proxy conflicts, and
saw the joint development of the Mekong as a first step in southeast Asia.
There would be no room for this approach in 1964-1965. At home, Johnson was
increasingly surrounded by hawks who, following the failures of 1963, had roped development in
with counterinsurgency and damned the entirety. Abroad, countries perceived America’s war
footing and chose to back away. Johnson’s vision for international, cooperative ventures would
never work if only he drove it forward.

Development without “Hearts and Minds”?
This project has assumed that “hearts and minds” were continuously lost because
development was either not implemented or not given proper priority status. Losing “hearts and
minds” and failing to develop, then, are tied together. There are reasons to believe, however, that
even in America’s most promising moments, even when development seemed a possibility in
South Vietnam, that development in the true American sense may have not won “hearts and minds”
anyways. Policies for development were built on fundamental misconceptions of Vietnamese
society, and threatened very basic elements of it, like subsistence farming. U.S. ideology,
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furthermore, was confused, and where defined it could not supplant the lack of “moral purpose”
with which the Vietnamese disregarded development.
The motto of the strategic hamlet program had been “It worked in Malaya—by God, it’s
going to work here.”5 Nothing could be further from the truth. One resists the urge to throw Edward
Said’s Orientalism at the civilian counterinsurgency policy planners who coined the term. But it
emphasizes the point that the civilian mission in South Vietnam “understood” the Vietnamese
people no better than the military mission did. Agrovilles had violently uprooted peasants, placed
them on new plots of land, and told them to build a new life. Though a consensus seemed to
develop in the aftermath of Diem’s agrovilles – that they were too disruptive, did not work, and
were counterproductive – the U.S. from 1962-1963 elected to bankroll and even greater project of
rural disruption and social chemistry, the strategic hamlet program. This produced much of the
same results; it also significantly helped the VC in their tactics and the NLF in their appeal.
Rufus Phillips in September of 1963 ably presented to president Kennedy why military and
civilian projects were failing in Vietnam. Strategic hamlets at that point could be said to be a nearmilitary endeavor, but their failure would ultimately reflect poorly on those who conceived of it.
There are reasons to doubt that strategic hamlets as they were originally envisioned, however,
would have made a broad appeal to peasants. Had peasants responded positively to the uprooting,
the herding, the barbed wire, and the free-fire zones, they would still have to reckon with American
notions of farming. Looking to their own country as the inevitable blueprint, U.S. policymakers
thought of agrarian development in terms of large-scale enterprise. They favored the way this
utilized land, brought greater employment, and even greater yields. In the minds of those who
championed development in South Vietnam, development would look like the doubling, tripling,
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quadrupling of a crop. Even in 1965, policymakers discussed the prospects of increasing the
national rice yield by 2 to 5 times in the next five years. Discussions agreed this would be an
objective good; only the turbulent countryside, controlled by the enemy, stood in the way.6
U.S. conceptions of the objective good in certain development initiatives, however, were
not likely to be shared. In Vietnam, a subsistence agriculture society had long prevailed. Largescale farming and international markets were never going to entice peasant farmers who had
enjoyed increased autonomy under the Viet Minh. Tough on landlords, the Viet Minh provided
farmers with the land and society necessary to more-comfortably feed their families. U.S. hopes
for vastly expanding the agrarian enterprise in South Vietnam would have decimated these
abilities. As the establishment of big plots strengthened the relationship between the U.S.-backed
government and landlords, maintaining a small piece of land for subsistence purposes would have
become untenable. U.S. development in this way would have torn even further at the very
framework of South Vietnamese society.
Development also proved disruptive in that it witnessed the proliferation of foreign aid and
personnel in an already-ravaged nation during the 1950’s. In Quagmire: Nation-Building and
Nature in the Mekong Delta, David Biggs contends that, even though U.S. policy makers talked
of development at great lengths, their perceived ideology of modernization did not transfer over to
South Vietham. Biggs writes:
[N]ation-building in this era was less an ideological campaign drafted in Washington and
Saigon and more a series of concrete events involving transfers of technology, bodies,
and new commodities into heavily contested regions beyond the major roads, canals,
cities, and airports.7
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The sole focus on the proliferation of developmental capital failed to get at what Ed Lansdale was
concerned with throughout the 1950’s: “how the Vietnamese felt.” But as David Lilienthal
surveyed southeast Asia in the early 1960’s, he found a region ripe for development only in terms
of resources; the people there lacked “a moral purpose,” without which no foreign intervention
could engender modernizing growth. Whatever the Vietnamese felt, the U.S. could neither deduce
nor impose their own conceptions of development on those feelings.
Regarding agrovilles and strategic hamlets, U.S. policy appeared especially devoid of
ideology. In the late 1950’s, the chief complaints lodged against the Diem regime by civilian
offices were that the president was failing to undertake land reform. When Diem finally did, he
was criticized for not going far enough: rents of 15-25% of the season’s harvest were considered
too onerous. What U.S. civilians failed to realize was that pre-Diem rent rates had typically ranged
between 40-60% of the season’s harvest.8 Diem had taken a big step. He was not inclined to
completely destroy the landlord class, as the group constituted his power and his allies in the
countryside. But what were U.S. goals in pressing Diem further? Civilian policy makers wanted
to significantly release the burden on peasants, and called for even lower rents and lesscumbersome contracts. Was the U.S. trying to “out-communist the communists” in land reform?
Simultaneously, they insisted that the landlord class not be completely wiped out. U.S. civilian
policymakers tiptoed towards communism and a grand assertion of tenants’ rights even as they
reaffirmed their capitalist mission in South Vietnam. What was palatable land reform supposed to
look like in South Vietnam? Diem could never have done enough to satisfy civilian policymakers
in this department. There was no ideology guiding the criticisms.
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With these concepts in mind, the concrete achievements of 1964-1965 can be seen as
meager development, but development nonetheless. But “hearts and minds” had not been won,
and were largely lost because of the disruptive policies which had aimed to promote development.
The desire to modernize South Vietnam was not shared between the giver and the receiver. And
as the U.S. turned increasingly to war, development efforts became synonymous with force. As
the U.S. escalated throughout Kennedy and Johnson, it hurt any chances for development. U.S.
development lacked ideology; communist warfare did not. As the foreign, capitalist superpower
attempted to provide guns and butter to a distant land, it became easier for the communists to train
the attention of the peasantry on the guns.

The American Failure in Vietnam
Had the U.S. been able to develop to the extent which civilian policymakers envisioned,
the issues discussed above would have likely created lasting tensions. But this is not the way things
went in Vietnam. The civilian mission was consistently ignored and stripped of authority. In this
process, the military was able to meet every obstacle with force. As the military increasingly
controlled the narrative of U.S. success in Vietnam, it ably rationalized that the failure of force
created a need for more force. Development was claimed to be a goal in the countryside, and
policymakers supposedly believed it would weaken the appeal of the insurgents as well. As force
and security were repeatedly prioritized over development, however, the appeal of the southern
insurgency only grew stronger. Rather than create efficient, modern villages, the U.S. destroyed
ancestral homes and aided an oppressive government in their relocation to defenseless villages and
political concentration camps. Self-determination was nowhere to be found. Especially during the
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Diem regime, U.S. efforts stoked nationalist and communist sentiment in a way that only a foreign,
capitalist superpower could.
Development projects that failed to start accentuated the prevailing role of the military, the
mindset of force, and the overall lack of concern for “hearts in minds” in Vietnam. Abandoning
whatever development projects the U.S. put in place created even more chaos. In a countryside
“blanketed with little Dienbienphus,” Vietnamese peasants in the 1960’s increasingly found
themselves with a faced with an easy choice: to side with the government, or the insurgents.
Against the government misused taxes, harassed peasants, and insisted on a factitious national
hegemony and cause, the combined appeal of the VC and the NLF proved seriously enticing. If a
village aligned with insurgents, they would find their taxes suddenly well-manage; landlords
would flee, and local leadership would be reintroduced; GVN forces wouldn’t dare approach, and
if they did, adequate defenses were in place; and a common goal of reunification and the
banishment of colonial powers quietly pervaded the countryside.
Johnson had long worked to establish himself as the president with the gumption needed
to redefine Cold Wat diplomacy; were his New Deal overtures to fail, however, he was also a man
of considerable resolve. Johnson’s grand vision may have been what development needed. But
Johnson redefined development in his approach: projects would have to be bigger, bolder, and
serve less to dissuade peasants from aiding insurgency and more to stop the gunfire altogether. To
assume that the Soviet Union and other Communist bloc nations could share in such imaginative
development schemes with the bastion of global Capitalism, or to assume that such cooperative
schemes were considered objective goods in the minds of all global leaders, put Johnson’s naiveté
on full display.
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From 1950-1965, a two-pronged policy did not work in Vietnam. As development was
sidestepped, the military perpetuated its own problems and created its role. Development saw little
progress during this era. When Johnson took office, a renewed hope in development briefly arose.
But it was not to be. Eisenhower and (more so) Kennedy had combined their objectives of force
and development in Vietnam to create a grand policy of failure, one which abetted the insurgency
crisis in the South. Johnson took a different approach, and placed the two on opposite ends of the
spectrum. Johnson saw war and development plainly, as starkly contrasting one another. If one
wasn’t going to work, the other would have to. With Johnson, it was to be guns or butter for
Vietnam. For too long, half of the two-pronged policy had corroded the other: U.S. military force
destroyed any chance of U.S. development. Realizing the contradiction, Johnson settled for just
one prong. Now U.S. military force would only destroy Vietnam. Americans had never held the
“hearts and minds” of the people in Vietnam, and now they never would.
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Note on the Bibliography
Sources found in the FRUS series are not listed in the bibliography. The entirety of the FRUS can
be found online using the footnotes provided. Sources cited from physical locations at The
Maryknoll Mission Archives (Ossining, NY), the LBJ Presidential Library (Austin, TX), and the
JFK Presidential Library (Boston, MA) also do not appear in the bibliography. Non-physical
primary documents from the JFK Library can be accessed online. They can be pursued on site
using the footnotes provided. Most New York Times articles were accessed using the ProQuest site.
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